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

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SELECTIONS FROM
TREITSCHKE'S
LECTURES ON
POLITICS

TRANSLATED BY
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PREFACE

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE was born in 1834 at Dresden, the son of a Saxon general of Bohemian origin. From 1858 to 1863 he lectured on history at Leipzig; from 1863 to 1866 he was professor at Freiburg. After a short period of activity at Kiel, he was in Heidelberg till 1874, when he went to Berlin, where he remained till his death in 1896.

The lectures on politics, from which the following selections were made, were delivered at Berlin University. Their general tenor is apparent from the extracts here given; their great popularity in Berlin and their tremendous influence on German thought is vividly described in "Germany and England," by the late Professor Cramb. His description might fittingly be supplemented by the illuminating passage which concludes Professor Meyer's brilliant criticism of Treitschke in his "Deutsche Literatur des Neunzehnten Jahrhundert": "But, for the very reason that his passions did carry him away, he can never be accused of dishonesty. He would have suffered martyrdom at any moment for what he said. His listeners felt this. When, after the first few minutes, they had grown accustomed to the strangely vibrant ring of his voice,

the curiously clipped elocution, with the deep breaths of that broad chest, seemed to them almost the only natural way of speaking—so greatly did it captivate the hearer. Nor was it otherwise with his matter. Treitschke was always convinced that no reasonable and honourable man could think otherwise than himself, so much was he identified with his convictions; nor did his own changes of opinion embarrass him. Wherever he marched, he took the field with all his forces, armed, eager for the fray, ready to conquer or to die; and thus he set a splendid example in an age full of pessimism, effeminacy and weariness. His personality was a factor in Germany's development."

I might only add that I have thought it best, in view of the great importance of so many of Treitschke's opinions, to follow the original as closely as possible, and to prefer a somewhat bald literalness to a more fluent English which would not express the exact sense of the German. The translation is made from the 1899-1900 edition.

A. L. G.

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POLITICS

BOOK I. THE NATURE OF THE STATE

§ 1. *The Conception of the State.*

THE State is the people legally united as an independent power. By "people" we understand, briefly, a plural number of families permanently living together. When this is recognized, it follows, that the State dates from the very beginning and is necessary, that it has existed as long as history and is as essential to humanity as language...

...The State is power for this reason only, that it may maintain itself alongside of other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the first tasks of even the rudest barbaric State. But these tasks are only conceivable in a plurality of States permanently existing alongside of one another. Hence the idea of a World-State is odious; the ideal of one State containing all mankind is no ideal at all. The

whole content of civilization cannot be realized in a single State; in no single people can the virtues of the aristocracy and the democracy be found combined. All peoples, just like individual men, are one-sided, but in the very fulness of this one-sidedness the richness of the human race is seen. The rays of the divine light only appear in individual nations infinitely broken; each one exhibits a different picture and a different conception of the divinity. Every people has therefore the right to believe that certain powers of the divine reason display themselves in it at their highest. Without overrating itself a people does not arrive at knowledge of itself at all. The Germans are always in danger of losing their nationality, because they have too little of this solid pride. The average German has very little political pride, but among us even Philistines are wont to have the pride of culture in the freedom and universality of the German spirit; and that is fortunate, for such a feeling is necessary, in order that a people may preserve and maintain itself.

... Yet how tragic is the fate of Spain, which discovered the New World and has preserved for itself to-day in a direct way nothing whatever of that great achievement of civilization! The Spanish have only the one advantage still left, that so many millions of

Spanish-speaking people live across the sea. Other nations have come to wrest from the Iberian nations the fruits of their labour; first Holland and then the English. History wears thoroughly masculine features; it is not for sentimental natures or for women. Only brave nations have a secure existence, a future, a development; weak and cowardly nations go to the wall, and rightly so. In this everlasting for and against of different States lies the beauty of history; to wish to abolish this rivalry is simply unreason. Mankind has perceived this in all ages. The world-empire of Alexander the Great was followed in natural reaction by the founding of the empires of the Diadochi and the Hellenized nations of the East. The huge one-sidedness of national thought in our century among most peoples and little peoples is nothing more than the natural reaction against the Napoleonic world-empire. The unsuccessful attempt to transform the many-sidedness of European life into the barren uniformity of a world-empire has had the natural consequence, that national thought makes itself so exclusively prominent to-day; world-citizenship has retired too far into the background.

If we consider further our definition: "The State is the people legally united as an independent power," we

may express it more shortly thus: "The State is the public power of offence and defence." The State is in the first instance power, that it may maintain itself; it is not the totality of the people itself, as Hegel assumed in his deification of the State—the people is not altogether amalgamated with it; but the State protects and embraces the life of the people, regulating it externally in all directions. On principle it does not ask how the people is disposed; it demands obedience: its laws must be kept, whether willingly or unwillingly. It is a step in advance when the silent obedience of the citizens becomes an inward, rational consent, but this consent is not absolutely necessary. Kingdoms have lasted for centuries as powerful, highly-developed States, without this inward consent of their citizens. What the State needs, is in the first place what is external; it wills that it be obeyed, its nature is to execute what it chooses. The terrible *βία βίᾳ βιάζεται* permeates the whole history of States. When the State can no longer carry out what it wills, it perishes in anarchy. What a contrast to the life of the Church! One may say: "Power is the principle of the State, as Faith is the principle of the Church, and Love of the family." The Church as an essentially internal system, which also leads an external life, but addresses itself in the first instance to the conscience, places value above everything on the mind; and a

Church stands the higher, the more inwardly and profoundly she is able to conceive this her nature. Therefore these words apply here: "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself." But, if the State chose to think thus, if it chanced to ask of its soldiers something in addition to the fulfilment of their military duties, that would be intolerable. The State says: "It is quite indifferent to me what you think about the matter, but you must obey." That is the reason why tender natures understand with such difficulty the life of the State: of women one can say in general, that in a normal way they only acquire comprehension of Law and State through their husbands, just as the normal man has by nature no inclination for the petty life of the household. One can understand that perfectly, for the idea of power is of course a stern one; to achieve one's purpose fully and unconditionally is here the highest and first thing. Therefore the peoples that form real States are not so much the nations which are gifted with genius as those whose strength lies in their character. Here the history of the world discloses a dreadful justice to the thoughtful inquirer. The visionary may lament it, but the serious thinker will recognize it to have been necessary that the cultivated Athenians should have succumbed to the Spartans, the Hellenes to the Romans; and that in like

manner highly-refined Florence could not sustain the struggle with Venice. In everything there lies an inherent necessity. The State is no Academy of Arts; if it neglects its power in favour of the ideal strivings of mankind, it renounces its nature and goes to ruin. The renunciation of its own power is for the State in the most real sense the sin against the Holy Ghost; to attach itself closely to a foreign State out of sentimentalism, as we Germans have often done with the English, is in fact a deadly sin.

...This truth remains: the essence of the State consists in this, that it can suffer no higher power above itself. How proud and truly worthy of a State was Gustavus Adolphus's declaration when he said: "I recognize no one above me but God and the sword of the victor." That is so unreservedly true, that we here again at once recognize that it cannot be the future of the human race to form one single political power, but that the ideal towards which we strive is an ordered company of nations, which lays down limitations of sovereignty in the way of voluntary treaties without doing away with that sovereignty.

Again, the conception of sovereignty can be no rigid one; it is elastic and relative like all political conceptions. Every State will for its own sake in a certain

respect limit its sovereignty by treaties. If States conclude treaties with one another, their completeness as powers is to some extent restricted. But that does not invalidate the rule, for every treaty is a voluntary limitation of the individual power, and all international treaties are written with the stipulation: *rebus sic stantibus*. A State cannot possibly bind its will for the future in respect to another State. The State has no higher judge above it, and will therefore conclude all its treaties with that silent reservation. This is vouched for by the truth, that, so long as there has been a law of nations, at the moment that war was declared between the contending States all treaties ceased; but every State has as sovereign the undoubted right to declare war when it chooses, consequently every State is in the position of being able to cancel any treaties which have been concluded. Upon this constant alteration of treaties the progress of history is founded; every State must see to it that its treaties remain in vigour and do not go out of date, so that another power does not denounce them by declaring war upon it. For treaties that have outlived themselves must be denounced, and new ones corresponding to the new conditions must take their place.

From this it is clear that the international treaties which restrict the will of a State are no absolute barriers, but voluntary limitations of itself. From

which certainly follows, that the erection of an international court of arbitration as a permanent institution is incompatible with the nature of the State. Only in questions of the second or third importance could it in any case submit itself to such a court of arbitration. For questions of vital importance there is no impartial foreign power in existence. If we committed the folly of treating the matter of Alsace as an open question and entrusted it to an arbiter, who will seriously believe that he could be impartial? And it is also a matter of honour for a State to determine such a question itself. Thus there can be no final international tribunal at all. Only, international treaties may become more frequent. But to the end of history arms will maintain their rights; and in that very point lies the sacredness of war.

If we apply the standard of self-government, it is to be observed, how in the company of States of Europe the larger States are gaining an ever more pronounced predominance, just as our State system has assumed an ever more aristocratic character. It is not yet so very long since that States like Piedmont-Savoy could actually turn the scale in a coalition by their adhesion or desertion. No one will consider that possible nowadays. Since the Seven Years' War the ascendency of the

Five Great Powers has developed itself, having proved itself necessary. Great European questions are discussed in that circle only. Italy is nearly on the point of entering it; but neither Belgium nor Sweden nor Switzerland may join in the discussion if they are not themselves directly concerned.

The whole development of our company of States aims unmistakably at ousting the States of the second rank. And here there present themselves, if we take the non-European world into consideration, prospects infinitely serious for ourselves. At the partition of the non-European world among the European powers, Germany has so far always had the worst of it, and yet the question whether we can also become an oversea power concerns our existence as a great State. Otherwise there presents itself the ghastly prospect of England and Russia dividing the world between them; in which case one really does not know which would be more immoral and more appalling, the Russian knout or the English purse.

If we look closer, it is manifest that, if the State is power, it is only the State that is really powerful that corresponds to our idea. Hence the undoubted ludicrousness that lies in the nature of a small State. Weakness, it is true, is nothing intrinsically ludicrous, but the weakness that tries to pose as power is indeed so. In small States there is developed that beggarly

frame of mind which judges the State by the taxes that it raises; which does not feel that, if the State may not press like an egg-shell, it cannot protect either, and that the moral benefits which we owe to the State are beyond all price. It is because it begets this materialism that the small State has so pernicious an effect on the mind of its citizens.

There is also completely lacking in small States the ability of the great State to be just. Whoever in a small State has a sufficient number of cousins, and is not quite an imbecile, is soon provided for. Of course the justice of the great State may easily degenerate into routine; it is not altogether possible here so to take into account personal and local conditions as in the narrower circumstances of small States... Thus administration by routine is an inevitable weakness of great States; but it can be considerably mitigated by a greater independence of provinces and municipalities.

Thus, when we sum up, we arrive at this result: that the great State has the nobler capacity. That is true above all of the great fundamental functions of the State, protection by arms, and law-making. Both can be much better carried out in a great State than in the small one...

Again, the economic superiority of great States is very obvious. In such great relations there lies also a

magnificent assurance of one's own safety. Economic crises can be far more easily surmounted by a great State than by a small one; failure of crops, for instance, will hardly affect it in all its parts. Only in great States can there be developed that genuine national pride which is the sign of the moral efficiency of a nation; the cosmopolitanism of the citizens becomes freer and greater in greater relations. Especially does the command of the sea work in this direction. "The free sea frees the mind;" that expression of the poet's is entirely true. A time may come when States without oversea possessions will no longer count among the great States at all.

We must thus be careful not to make pedantic inferences from detached facts; but, if we survey history in the mass, it is clear that all real masterpieces of poetry and art arose upon the soil of great nationalities. Proud Florence and Venice had such a great world-intercourse that there could be no question in their cases of the Philistinism of the small State. In the great mass of the citizens there was an ideal pride that recalls ancient Athens. The poet and artist must be able to react upon a great nation. When did a masterpiece ever arise among a petty little nation? The "Lusiads" belongs to a time in which Portugal had

discovered half the world. Thorwaldsen was no Dane; he was born on a ship on the voyage from Iceland to Denmark, and came very early to Rome. Of Danish qualities one discovers absolutely nothing in his works. He was a modern Hellene; to the question what his birthday was, he answered: "I don't know; I came for the first time to Rome on March 8th, 1797."

More frequently to be observed in modern history are the momentous consequences of an exclusively social existence. A nation that lives for nothing but these social desires, that wishes only to become richer and to live more comfortably, falls a complete victim to the baser natural instincts. What a splendid people the Dutch were in the days of combat against the Spanish world-power! Hardly was their independence assured, however, when all the curse of peace also began to have its effects upon the people. In misfortune there lies a hardening influence for noble nations; in prosperity even they run the risk of becoming a prey to sloth. Thus the once so brave Dutchmen have turned into creditors of the State and have degenerated thereby, even physically. That is the curse of a people that is quite engrossed in social life and loses the taste for political greatness.

§ 2. *The Aim of the State.*

... Here it is very obvious that the first task of the State is a twofold one: it is, as we have seen, power in an external direction and the regulation of justice internally; its fundamental functions must therefore be the organization of the army and the administration of the law, in order to protect the community of its citizens from external attack, and to keep them within bounds internally...

The second essential function of the State is to make war. That we have so long failed to appreciate this, is a proof how effeminate the science of the State as treated by the hands of civilians had finally become. In our century, since Clausewitz, this sentimental conception has disappeared; but its place has been taken by a narrowly materialistic one, which looks upon man, after the manner of Manchesterdom, as a two-legged being whose destiny is to buy cheap and to sell dear. That this conception is also very unfavourable to war is explainable; only after the experiences of our last wars did a healthy view of the State and its warlike power gradually emerge again. Without war there would be no State at all. All the States known to us

have arisen through wars; the protection of its citizens by arms remains the first and essential task of the State. And so war will last till the end of history, as long as there is a plural number of States. That it could ever be otherwise is neither to be deduced from the laws of thought or from human nature, nor in any way desirable. The blind worshippers of perpetual peace commit the error of thought, that they isolate the State or dream of a World-State, which we have already recognized as something irrational.

Since it is, further, impossible, as we have also already seen, even to picture to oneself a higher judge above States, which are sovereign by their nature, the condition of war cannot be imagined away out of the world. It is a favourite fashion of our time to hold up England as especially inclined to peace. But England is always making war; there has been hardly a moment in modern history in which she had not to fight somewhere. The great advances of mankind in civilization can only be entirely realized, in face of the resistance of barbarism and unreason, by the sword. And even among the civilized peoples war remains the form of lawsuit by which the claims of States are enforced. The proofs which are led in these dreadful international lawsuits are more compelling than the proofs in any civil lawsuit. How often did we seek to convince the small States theoretically that only

Prussia could assume the leadership in Germany; the really convincing proof we were obliged to furnish on the battlefields in Bohemia and on the Main. War is also an element that unites nations, not one that only separates them: it does not only bring nations together as enemies; they also learn through it to know and respect one another in their particular idiosyncrasies.

We must, of course, also remember in our consideration of war that it does not always appear as a divine judgement; here, too, there are transient successes, but the life of nations is reckoned by centuries. We can only obtain the final verdict by the survey of long epochs. A State like the Prussian, which by the qualities of its people was always freer and more rational internally than the French, might indeed, because of transient enervation, come near to destruction, but it was able again to remember its inner nature and maintain its superiority. One must say in the most decided manner: "War is the only remedy for ailing nations." The moment the State calls: "Myself and my existence are now at stake!" social self-seeking must fall back and every party hate be silent. The individual must forget his own ego and feel himself a member of the whole; he must recognize what a nothing his life is in comparison with the general welfare. In that very point lies the loftiness of war, that the small man disappears entirely before

the great thought of the State; the sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another is nowhere so splendidly exhibited as in war. In such days the chaff is separated from the wheat...

It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while materialism condemns them. What a perversion of morality to wish to eliminate heroism from humanity! It is the heroes of a nation who are the figures that delight and inspire youthful minds; and among authors it is those whose words ring like the sound of trumpets whom as boys and youths we most admire. He who does not delight in them is too cowardly to bear arms himself for the fatherland. All reference to Christianity in this case is perverse. The Bible says explicitly that the powers that be shall bear the sword, and it also says: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Those who declaim this nonsense of a perpetual peace do not understand the Aryan peoples; the Aryan peoples are above all things brave. They have always been men enough to protect with the sword what they had won by the spirit...

We must not consider all these things by the light of the reading-lamp alone; to the historian who lives in the world of will it is immediately clear that the demand for a perpetual peace is thoroughly reactionary; he sees that with war all movement, all growth,

must be struck out of history. It has always been the tired, unintelligent, and enervated periods that have played with the dream of perpetual peace... However, it is not worth the trouble to discuss this matter further; the living God will see to it that war constantly returns as a dreadful medicine for the human race.

With all this it is not our intention to deny that with the progress of civilization wars must become fewer and shorter. All civilization aims at making human life more harmonious. Just as the abrupt alternation of sensualism and asceticism, which is characteristic of the Middle Ages, is no longer natural to the men of to-day, so does war, which connotes a complete breach with the everyday life, appear for that very reason so dreadful to us. The more refined man perceives, indeed, that he must kill hostile opponents, whose bravery he esteems highly; he feels that the majesty of war consists in the very fact that murder is done in this case without passion; therefore the struggle costs him much more self-conquest than it does the barbarian.

And the economic ravages of war are also much greater with civilized nations than with barbarians. A war nowadays may have stern, fearful consequences, especially through the destruction of the ingenious credit system. If it were ever to happen that a

conqueror entered London, the effect would be simply appalling. There meet the threads of the credit of millions, and a conqueror of Napoleon's ruthlessness could cause ravages there of which we have as yet not the slightest conception. From the natural horror men have for the shedding of blood, from the size and quality of modern armies, it necessarily follows that wars must become fewer and shorter, for it is impossible to see how the burdens of a great war can be borne for any prolonged period under present conditions in the world. But it is a fallacy to infer from that that they could ever cease altogether. They cannot and should not cease, so long as the State is sovereign and confronts other sovereign States.

§ 3. *The Relation of the State to the Moral Law.*

... It was Machiavelli who expressed the thought that, when the safety of the State was at stake, the purity of the means employed should not be called in question; if only the State were preserved, every one would subsequently approve of the means. In order to understand Machiavelli, we must take him historically. He is the son of a race that is in the act of passing out of the limitations of the Middle Ages into the subjective freedom of modern thought. Round

about him in Italy he saw the prodigious forms of those tyrants in whom the lavish endowments of that gifted people were so wonderfully exhibited. These tyrants of Italy were all born Mæcenases; they also said, like the great artist: "I am myself alone." Machiavelli took delight in these gifted, powerful men. It will ever remain Machiavelli's glory that he set the State upon its own feet and freed it in its morality from the Church; and also, above all, that he declared clearly for the first time: "The State is power." In spite of this, however, Machiavelli himself still stands with one foot on the threshold of the Middle Ages. When he tries to set the State free from the Church, and says, with the boldness of the modern Italian patriot, that the Chair of Rome has hurled Italy into despair and misery, he nevertheless does not get rid of the idea that morality is altogether ecclesiastical, and, while he drags the State away from the Church, he drags it away from the moral law altogether. He says: "The State must pursue its power as its only objective; what is good for that purpose is proper and necessary." Machiavelli tries to think as one of the ancients, and yet he cannot do it, because he has eaten of the tree of knowledge; because he is a Christian without knowing it and without wishing it.

Thus his view of the freedom of political morality has remained in many ways a troubled and confused

one, because of his place in a period of transition. That must not hinder us from declaring joyfully that the gifted Florentine, with all the vast consequence of his thinking, was the first to set in the centre of all politics the great thought: "The State is power." For that is the truth; and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face ought to keep his hands off politics. We must never forget this great service of Machiavelli's, even if we clearly recognize the deep immorality in other respects of his teaching regarding the State. It is not the fact that he is entirely indifferent as to the means employed by power that revolts us, but that everything turns upon how the highest power is acquired and retained, and that this power itself has no content for him. That the power acquired must justify itself by employing itself for the highest moral good of mankind, of that we find no trace in his teaching.

Machiavelli has entirely failed to see how this doctrine of mere power is self-contradictory even from his own standpoint. Whom does he put forward as the ideal of a clever and capable prince? Cæsar Borgia. But can this uncanny man be looked upon as the ideal of a statesman even in Machiavelli's sense? Did he, by chance, create anything enduring? His State was broken up immediately after his death. After he had brought countless numbers into the trap,

he was enticed into it himself and perished miserably. A power that treads all right underfoot must in the end itself perish, for in the moral world nothing remains firm that is not able to resist.

Since, then, Machiavelli's ideas stand out in terrible nakedness and hardness, the book of "The Prince" has in it for most men something quite terrifying, but its effects up to the present day have been immense. Even Napoleon III.'s *coup d'état* was evidently prepared according to Machiavelli's recipe. The book has in practice become a teacher again and again, mostly in his own time; William of Orange kept it constantly under the pillow of his couch. The whole seventeenth century is filled with Machiavellism, with a statesmanship which tramples the moral laws underfoot as a matter of principle. This "reason of State," a policy that inquires only concerning expediency for the State, becomes towards the end of the seventeenth century of an unscrupulousness such as we can no longer form an idea of nowadays. The ugly connotation that the word "political" has had so long among the common people dates from that period. Machiavelli's book was called "The Devil's Catechism," or "The Ten Commandments Reversed"; his name became a term of disgust; a great literature of works written against him arose, each one more moral than the other. It is sad to observe that so-called public opinion is always much more moral

than the deeds of the individuals themselves. The average man is ashamed to mention publicly and to approve a thousand things that he actually does. What the ordinary man, when he is not himself concerned, can accomplish in the way of Cossack-like defence of virtue is unbelievable. He who has felt profoundly unhappy, he who has once believed that he would never escape from his inward grief, may become a misanthropist when he listens to his comforters. Therefore among all nations the public opinion that comes to the light is very naturally much more severe than the real thoughts of men.

Of course journalistic phrase-mongers talk of great statesmen as of a disreputable class of men, as if lying was inseparable from diplomacy. The very opposite is the truth. The really great statesmen have always been distinguished by an immense openness. Frederick the Great declared before every one of his wars with the greatest precision what it was he wished to attain. It is true that he did not despise cunning as a means, but upon the whole his truthfulness is one of his predominant characteristics. How potent, with all his slyness in details, is Bismarck's solid frankness in great matters! And it was the most effective weapon for him, for the small diplomatists always

believed the opposite when he frankly declared what he wanted. If we survey human callings, in which are the most lies told? Obviously in the world of commerce; and that has been so at all times. Here in the matter of advertising lying has been actually turned into a system. Compared with it diplomacy appears innocent as a dove. And the immeasurable difference therewith! If an unscrupulous speculator lies on the Stock Exchange, he thinks only of his own purse; but a diplomatist thinks of his country if during a political negotiation he becomes guilty of an obscuration of facts. As historians, who seek to survey the whole of human life, we must therefore say that the diplomatic calling is a much more moral one than that of the merchant. The moral danger that is nearest to the diplomatist does not lie in mendacity, but in the spiritual shallowness that is born of the elegant life of the *salon*.

If we now apply this standard of a more profound and genuinely Christian morality to the State, and if we remember that the essence of this great collective personality is power, then it is in that case the highest moral duty of the State to safeguard its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for a higher community, of which he is a member; but the State is

itself the highest in the external community of men, therefore the duty of self-elimination cannot affect it at all. The Christian duty of self-sacrifice for something higher has no existence whatever for the State, because there is nothing whatever beyond it in world-history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself for anything higher. If the State sees its downfall confronting it, we praise it if it falls sword in hand. Self-sacrifice for a foreign nation is not only not moral, but it contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest thing for the State.

Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public and private morality. The order of rank of the various duties must necessarily be for the State, as it is power, quite other than for individual men. A whole series of these duties, which are obligatory on the individual, are not to be thought of in any case for the State. To maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment; that is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare that of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy Ghost...

It further follows from the nature of the State as sovereign Power that it cannot recognize an arbiter

above itself, and consequently legal obligations must in the last resort be subject to its own judgement. We must keep this in view, in order not to judge pedantically in great crises from the standpoint of the advocate. When Prussia broke the treaty of Tilsit, it was in the wrong from the standpoint of civil law. But who will have the brazenness to maintain this at the present time? The French themselves do so no longer. This is true also of international treaties, which are not quite as immoral as that compulsory one between Prussia and France was. Thus every State reserves to itself the right to decide upon its treaty obligations, and here the historian cannot make a merely formal standard suffice. He must ask the deeper question: whether the unconditioned duty of self-preservation does not justify the State. Such was the case in Italy in 1859. Formally, of course, Piedmont was the aggressor; and Austria and her servile adherents in Germany were not slow to complain of the interruption of the perpetual peace. In reality, however, Italy had been for years under martial law. No noble nation endures such a position, and as a matter of fact it was not Piedmont, but Austria, that was the aggressor, for she had sinned shamelessly for years against the greatest good of the Italians.

Thus the mere preservation of its power is an incomparably high moral task for the State. But, if we

follow out the consequences of this truth, it is clear that the State must only set moral aims before it, otherwise it would contradict itself. The policy, in principle immoral, of naked and brutal greed of territory, as Napoleon I. pursued it, is also in the highest degree impolitic. France had in no wise the power to assimilate its conquests and, as Napoleon desired, to become the leading State of Europe. It was a sin against the spirit of history that the rich diversity of kindred peoples should be changed into the dreary uniformity of a world-empire. Such a naked policy of conquest in the long run destroys its own instruments. When Napoleon made his appearance, his army was the best in Europe. It was supported by the moral strength of genuine enthusiasm and a discipline worthy of admiration. How was this changed in the year 1812! Napoleon brought only a fourth part of his troops to Moscow, without having lost a battle. A moral disorderliness had set in, which really decided the Russian campaign. The policy of world-conquest of our ancient German empire we also recognize to-day to have been a huge blunder. It presumed to take possession of countries which could not be fitted to the national State as living members. We have been punished for these sins for centuries since by our passive cosmopolitanism. It is just as immoral, and impolitic at the same time, if the State interferes by

forcible repression with the religious life of its subjects, for here it touches the marrow of its people. Through the fact that Austria, during the religious struggles, persecuted and expelled many of her best Germans, Germanism in that State suffered a blow from which it has not yet recovered.

So even the State is everywhere subjected to the laws of its moral nature, which it may not infringe with impunity. Statesmanship demands an iron character, a man of strong nerves, who is in a position to overcome in the numerous conflicts to which it leads. It demands above all great intelligence. Astuteness is for the statesman, on whose shoulders the fate of millions rests, not only an intellectual, but a moral virtue. He must be able to observe things as they really are; and, if he cannot do that, he must keep his awkward hands away from things he does not understand...

Thus far there can hardly have been anything that serious thinkers will dispute, but, on the other hand, a series of the most difficult questions begins with the consideration to what extent, for intrinsically moral aims, it is permissible in politics to employ me ns which in ordinary civil life would be looked upon as reprehensible. The well-known expression of the Jesuits is indeed brutal and radical in its abruptness, but no one can dispute the fact that it contains a certain amount

of truth. There are, unfortunately, numberless cases in the life of the State, as in the life of the individual, in which the employment of perfectly pure means is impossible. If it is possible, if an intrinsically moral aim can be attained with moral means, these are to be preferred, even if they lead more slowly and awkwardly to the goal.

We have already seen that the power of truth and openness in politics is much greater than is usually maintained. The modern idea is that there is no love of truth at all in man; everything is said to have arisen conventionally in course of law because of the object in view. No, there is a love of truth born in us that varies only according to times and peoples. Even among the nations most given to lying, the Orientals, we find this love of truth. Wellington's elder brother acquired an immense power in India through the fact that the Nabobs knew: "This man always says what he thinks." On the whole, however, it is clear that the means which policy employs towards peoples which are still on a lower level of civilization must be suited to their capacity of feeling and comprehension. The historian who would judge European policy in Africa or in the East in the same way as that in Europe would be a fool. He who cannot instil fear in these places is lost. If the English during the Indian Mutiny tied the Hindus to the mouths of the

cannons and blew them to pieces, so that their bodies were scattered to all the winds, we cannot blame that, seeing that death immediately supervened. It is clear that in such a position terrorizing means had to be adopted; and if we accept as true, what an Englisman will certainly maintain, that the English rule in India is moral and necessary, then we cannot in that case condemn these means.

Thus it behoves us to apply the standard of relativity to place as well as to time. If you remember, further, that in international intercourse States very often remain for many decades in a condition of veiled warfare, then it is quite evident that many diplomatic wiles are justified by this condition of latent warfare alone. Think of the negotiations between Bismarck and Benedetti. Bismarck had the hope that he might possibly still avoid a great war; then Benedetti came with his shameless demands; was it not quite moral for Bismarck to put him off with half-promises, as if Germany might consent? The like is the case with methods of bribery against another State in such circumstances of latent warfare. It is ridiculous to oppose this with moral bluster and to demand that in such a position a State should always take its catechism in its hand first. Before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War Frederick had the presentiment that some storm was gathering over his little State. There-

upon he bribed two Saxon-Polish secretaries in Dresden and Warsaw and obtained news from them, which fortunately was exaggerated. Should King Frederick, when he put to himself the question: "How shall I rescue my noble Prussia from ruin?" have had respect for the official regulations of the electorate of Saxony? Every State knows this about the other: there is no State in the world that at such junctures would not keep rascals for the purpose of spying. Only the results of such means must not be exaggerated; they play only a small part. But it is clear that they must be permitted to the Foreign Office of a great nation against alien States.

Within our own State, on the other hand, the morality must be much purer and more susceptible, for the regulations of my own State are sacred to me. As for inner party politics, the existence of forms of corruption can be established everywhere. In our Parliaments there are, of course, occasional cases of tacit, indirect corruption. That the shareholders of great industrial undertakings practise bribery, appears indeed from time to time, but it is nevertheless comparatively rare. Look at England, on the other hand, with its Parliament, half of which consists of railway directors, or at Spain!

§ 4. *The Rise and Fall of States.*

. . . States do not arise out of the people's sovereignty, but they are created against the will of the people; the State is the power of the stronger race which establishes itself.

And indeed there is nothing to be regretted in all this. In conditions so simple material power must decide, and this power of the victor justifies itself morally, by becoming a protection and thereby working beneficially. How wittily has Thucydides expressed this in the introduction to his history, which contains a host of flashes of inspired thought! In it he portrays the half-legendary Minos of Crete, how he conquered the supremacy for himself, but then used his assured power to free the seas round about from pirates, and thereby to make his supremacy beneficial and bearable. In the further course of history, also, among all forces that we know, war is the mightiest and most efficient moulder of nations. Only in war does a nation became a nation, and the expansion of existing States proceeds in most cases by the way of conquest, even if afterwards the results of the armed combat are recognized by treaty.

All great nations of history, when they had become strong, have felt the craving to impress the seal of their nature upon barbaric lands. And to-day we see the nations of Europe busily engaged in creating all over the globe a wholesale aristocracy of the white race. That nation which does not take a share in this great rivalry will play a pitiful part at some later day. It is therefore a vital question for a great nation to-day to display a craving for colonies. The first nation of history to recognize the majesty of a world-trade, the Phœnician, was also a great colonizer. Then follows the colonization of the Greeks in the eastern and western basins of the Mediterrancan; then the Romans; in the Middle Ages the Germans, Spanish and Portuguese; finally Holland and England, after the Germans were entirely eliminated for a long space from the number of maritime powers.

Agricultural colonies are certainly the richest in blessings for the national life. In districts which in their climate correspond in some measure to our own and permit large emigration from the mother country, as huge an increase of population as we find in America can, under favourable economic conditions, take place. But in the case of such colonies the danger is also most threatening, of their turning against the mother country and seeking to break loose from it. England, schooled by experience, has learned to avoid this. The

independence of the English colonies goes so far, indeed, that they have even tariff walls against the mother country.

The reciprocal relations between colony and mother country belong to the most delicate problems of history, and in this case we should beware of endeavouring to discover natural laws in the world of history, that is to say, in the world of freedom. No one will try to maintain to-day that colonies must of necessity break loose from the mother country. That Canada will do this one day is probable, above all because the best part of Canada is French. Whether, on the other hand, Australia will ever break away, is more than doubtful; an English policy of some astuteness would probably be able to prevent that. It will depend what men are at the wheel in Australia and England, and how they recognize the signs of the times. But, even if England found herself compelled to give up a part of her colonies, she would still retain an incalculable advantage as regards culture and economics, for the bond of the mother tongue is an eminently important momentum in trade. Thus North America's principal business connection is still with England. A colony, that is attached to the mother country by language and culture, never becomes entirely lost to it, even if it breaks away politically. That is also proved by the relations between America and England. What does

it not signify, that there will soon be three hundred millions of English-speaking people?

We, on the other hand, see to-day what we have missed. The consequences of the last half-century have been terrible; in it England has first conquered the world. The Continent, in continual unrest, had no time to turn its eyes across the sea, where England seized upon everything. The Germans have been obliged to miss this and to sleep through it, because they had so much to do with their neighbours and with their own internal struggles. Without any doubt whatever a great colonial development is a fortunate thing for a nation. And that is where the short-sightedness of our opponents of colonies at the present day comes in, that they do not understand this. Yet the whole position of Germany hangs upon how many millions of people will speak German in the future.

If it is maintained that the emigration of Germans to America is an advantage, that is a piece of folly. What has Germany gained from the fact that thousands of her best sons, who could not find a livelihood at home, have turned their backs on the fatherland? They are lost to it for ever. If the emigrant himself is perhaps still united by certain natural ties to his home, his children, as a rule, but in any case his grandchildren, are Germans no more; for the German learns only too easily to renounce his fatherland. And indeed

in America they are in no position to maintain their nationality permanently. Just as certainly as the Huguenots, when they immigrated into the march of Brandenburg, were on the average more cultivated than the Brandenburgers and were yet obliged to lose their nationality amid the multitude of the old inhabitants, in like manner was this the case with the Germans in America. Almost a third of the population of North America is of German origin. How much of the most valuable energies have we lost through emigration, and are still losing daily, without obtaining even the slightest compensation therefor! The working power as well as the capital of the emigrants is lost to us. What incalculable financial advantages would these people afford us as colonists!

Thus that colonization which preserves homogeneous nationality has become a factor of huge importance for the future of the world. It will depend upon it in what measure each nation will participate in the domination of the world by the white race; it is very easily conceivable that a country that has no colonies will one day cease to be numbered among the Great Powers of Europe, however powerful it may be otherwise. On that account we must not arrive at that stage of torpor which is the consequence of a purely continental policy, and the result of our next successful war must if possible be the acquisition of some colony.

§ 5. *Government and Governed.*

The position is similar in military affairs. Formerly, so long as the State was looked upon as an economic undertaking, the opinion prevailed in Germany that the economic principle of division of labour should also be applied to the army. Professional soldiers, well-drilled mercenaries, were demanded, so that civilian life should be preserved as much as possible from the confusion of war. Only stern and great experiences have brought a change in this matter, and now even the average man feels that military affairs stand higher than economic interests, that they are exalted beyond all price, that it is here a matter of moral energies, and that these are most surely awakened and turned to account when the obligation to bear arms is universal.

This naïve selfishness of the governed is opposed by the essentially politic view of those who govern, who do not look upon the State from within a group of interests, but from the standpoint of the whole. They think first of the power and unity of the whole; and, as they bear the heavy responsibility of the fate of millions, they look upon strict obedience as the first requisite. Therefore, in every sound government the need of permanence must predominate. It is a well-

known experience that members of the opposition who have entered the government have in most cases to suffer the reproach of their former associates that they have changed their opinions and are no longer free. Quite wrongly; for the same men, who formerly criticized the government from a partial standpoint, now see for the first time that it has to study many other circles of interests. It is for that reason that self-administration is of such great political importance, for it fills even the middle classes with the ideas of the government. When the greatest possible number of citizens is attracted to political self-activity and helps to bear the responsibility of administration, a great proportion of the nation is filled with expert knowledge of political affairs and acquires also something of the feeling of responsibility.

From an unprejudiced consideration of history it clearly results that parties are a political necessity for free peoples. By means of party life the countless opinions of all individuals are concentrated in an average opinion, which establishes the vague opinion of the individual in a definite direction. If the necessity of taking a side may be beneficial as a stimulus for many natures, on the other hand the terrorism of the party system has also, of course, a pernicious

effect, for it is clear that every party is and must be one-sided. A purely national party can only be found, say, in nations that are still fighting for independence, for liberation from an anti-national power. Thus a union of all parties took place in Piedmont in 1859 under the influence of Cavour. That great man carried all parties in the State along with him at that time; all opposition grew silent before the common task of the national unity of Italy. In a well-ordered, independent State there will be no national party. The name "national liberal" was a brilliant discovery, sounding so well that it pleases everybody, but it is only a name.

BOOK II. THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE

§ 6. *Country and People.*

THUS the same geographical conditions have had very different effects according to the degrees of civilization of the inhabitants. The history of England shows this very conspicuously. England has always been an island; but what different effects this insular position has had at different periods! In the days of the Norwegian sea-kings, when the Vikings ruled all the seas, an island was more exposed to hostile attacks than the mainland. A wholesome shaking-up of different ethnographical elements took place; and so that mixture of peoples became possible on which England's modern history is essentially based. In later days, when the organization of the sea-robbers was broken up, and the country became more thickly populated, Shakespeare could speak of the silver wall behind which England might stand calmly and securely. That is still true to-day; and so the same insular position has made possible for the country

in modern times an almost uninterrupted national development.

Thus we see how climatic conditions regulate economic and civilized life in the strictest fashion. . .

If we apply this standard, we may again regard England as wonderfully preferred by Nature. Her situation and configuration are enviably favourable; a temperate, moist climate, which allows the fruits of the field to ripen in a way that is not by a long way possible in our East. In England the farmer is only obliged to stop work for about four weeks, while ours must be idle almost all winter. Add to this the insular position, the configuration of the coast, the short rivers, which, however, are accessible to ebb and flow. A few leagues above London the Thames is a tiny, charming stream, flowing among meadows; at London it is a powerful river, which carries the largest ships. A brave and diligent nation was bound of necessity to become great and powerful under such conditions.

As for the geographical conditions of the State, among all the gifts of Nature there is none in this connection more valuable than position on the sea. Yet it depends in this case also whether a nation understands how to make use of this advantage. The Spartans, as is well known, had a coast-line as well as

the Athenians, yet their State always remained an inland State, while Athens became great as a sea-power. It may be asserted that a great development of the State without the sea is in the long run impossible. Every State that calls itself great, whose endeavour it is to stand upon its own feet, must have a coast. Only by means of it is it really free. That is so evident that whole epochs of history can be explained from this one circumstance. The key to the opposition between Poland and Germany is to be found here. When German colonization had proceeded so far to the east along the coast, while the hinterland remained Slavonic, a deadly enmity, which no one could prevent, was the result. Poland was obliged to endeavour to win for herself the mouths of her streams; the Germans on their side could not permit that. A geographical opposition was thereby produced, which did not admit of alteration. Every young, rising nation presses forward remorselessly towards the sea-coast. As soon as the Hungarians had carried through their dualism in 1867, the first thing they did was to demand for themselves, and to obtain, too, from the weakness of Austria, the old land on the sea-coast; thus Hungary got her port of Fiume.

In all this there lies a natural compulsion. The sea has an invigorating effect on all the customs of a people; in the case of seafaring nations complete want

of freedom can only be found as an exception. There is hardly any calling practised by men which rejects all inefficiency so thoroughly as that of the sailor; that is why human energy can prosper so freely in this calling. It breeds an essentially democratic view of things that inquires and judges by what is achieved alone. If we compare Sparta and Athens we see clearly how the sea-power of Athens reacted upon the whole character of the State; in contrast to Sparta, which always remained inland and never obtained a spiritually free horizon.

Our stick-in-the-mud conditions in Germany have been the fault principally of the purely inland policy of the house of Hapsburg. Wallenstein appears in this connection like a meteor; he was an inspired genius, who certainly conceived the thought of making a German seaport out of the bay of the Jade and of excavating a canal between the North Sea and the Baltic. Germany has, it must be admitted, been cared for by Nature in stepmotherly fashion. The Baltic bears overwhelmingly the character of an inland sea. This can be recognized from the fact that the effect of the sea upon the people who dwell beside it is very small. A few leagues from the coast in Pomerania one hardly guesses that one is near the sea. The North Sea has the worst shore imaginable in Germany because of the sand-flats. The whole is as unfavourable as

possible; but even here can be seen how man is able to overcome natural obstacles. This Germany with its forbidding coast-line was yet once on a time the leading sea-power, and, please God, it shall become so again.

The territories drained by great rivers are usually centres of civilization. Even in the most ancient times it followed the great streams, the Hoang-ho and Yang-tse-kiang, the Indus, Ganges and Nile. Germany, otherwise treated by Nature in such stepmotherly fashion, is in this instance to be called fortunate—if it ever fulfils its mission, if it one day possesses its stream entire. Our Rhine remains the king of all rivers. What great thing has ever happened on the Danube? On the contrary, on the Rhine, wherever we go, there is historical life in plenty. From the oldest days of the Germans up to the most modern times, what a wealth of historical reminiscences! The French, or even the Italians, cannot excel us in this. It is an infinitely precious natural possession, but through our own fault the part that is of most material value has come into foreign hands, and it is an indispensable task of German policy to win back the mouths of the stream. A purely political union is not necessary, for the Dutch have now developed into an independent nation; but

an economic alliance is indispensable. And we are much too shy if we do not venture to declare that the entrance of Holland into our Customs Union is as necessary to us as our daily bread. Nowhere in the world is there so much declaiming by fools about Chauvinism as in Germany, and nowhere is there so little Chauvinism as with us. We fear to give expression to the most natural claims that a nation can have.

The configuration of the boundary of the State is at the present day more important than at any previous epoch of history. To be able to concentrate forces on the frontier is an immeasurable advantage in an age of wars in mass. Undoubtedly, the sea is the most fortunate frontier that a country can have. The desire of all States for self-preservation explains the fact that the high seas are considered as quite free; on the other hand, every State polices the sea facing its coast-line, so far as it can dominate it in a military sense, that is, within cannon-range. It has, indeed, become doubtful what is to be understood by this, but new arrangements will be come to regarding it. On the whole it will be established that on the sea the power of the State ceases where its physical force ceases. The sea does not only separate, it also

unites all nations; therefore the sea-coast is the most advantageous politically, as the position of England shows very clearly. Of course, a wholly insular position may also lull a nation into a dangerous feeling of security and detract from its military strength.

In every case in judging the climate and the other natural conditions of a country the question turns, in the first place, upon the conditions of material life which result therefrom. The moral and the purely æsthetic take the second place. But the latter must not on that account be undervalued. The misty, foggy climate has had a by no means favourable effect upon the inhabitants of England; in London there are times when in a thick fog the spleen lies in the air. Besides, the country lacks wine, and wine is undeniably an important factor in a cheerful, liberal culture. If our Rhenish country-folk boast with pride that they have wine in their bones, they are in a certain sense quite justified. A drink that only intoxicates slightly, and does not, like brandy, produce a bestial drunkenness, enlivens and relieves the mind. It will never be possible for a true Rhinelander to become accustomed to the beer-tippling which prevails among us here.

The climate, the lack of wine and of beauty of

scenery have indisputably had an unfavourable effect upon English culture. While the English can exhibit a truly great literature, they have never achieved anything outstanding in music or in the fine arts; poetry, in particular, is much less dependent upon these natural conditions than the fine arts or music. In fact, there is even a beauty and majestic elevation of Nature that oppresses men. What example of artistic greatness has proceeded from the magnificent Alpine countries? Relatively very little. Walther von der Vogelweide, if he really came thence, would be the only great poet that the Tyrol has brought forth; and even Switzerland has only lately produced a true poet in Gottfried Keller. It has always been the case that a country of lofty mountains has only by way of exception been the seat of higher culture. There simple conditions exist, heroic jäger-natures, men for the most part sturdy and well built, but also of limited outlook. On the contrary, countries with mountains of moderate height, like the charming valleys of Suabia and Franconia and the friendly chains of green heights of Thuringia, have produced a multitude of poets and artists. He who does not feel poetically inclined in Heidelberg or in Bonn is lost to poetry altogether. There Nature has an elevating and gladdening effect, without oppressing men.

The English are the most fortunate. The population of this little island has thrown out so many shoots that there are already at the present time more than a hundred millions of people of English descent. In this fact alone is the importance of colonies revealed. A nation which seeks to acquire new realms of exploitation, in order to be able to support its growing population, shows the courage of its confidence in God. The contemptuous way in which these deeply serious things are discussed at the present time is simply appalling. People sing a new song to the old tune: "Be smaller, fatherland of mine!" That is simply turning the world upside-down. We wish and ought to take our share in the domination of the world by the white race. We have still an infinite deal to learn from England in this connection, and a press that tries to dismiss these serious things with some poor jokes shows that it has no suspicion whatever of the sacredness of our tasks of civilization. It is a healthy and normal phenomenon when a civilized nation anticipates the obvious dangers of over-population by colonization on a large scale. There is no mutilation of Nature practised here, and a wide field for healthy activity is opened up, which at the same time increases the national strength of the mother country. For all talk of possible separation of the colonies is folly, when one observes what even separated colonies still mean for

the mother country. The material and moral benefits of such an increase of the nation cannot possibly be estimated sufficiently highly.

§ 7. *The Family.*

In the nineteenth century, on the contrary, rough, masculine customs again appear. A worship of woman in theory, along with boorishness in practice, is the characteristic of our time. Through the unnatural lateness of marriages prostitution has become so extensive, and flaunts itself with such impudence, that even the tone of intercourse in society has been vitiated by it. Thence the unfortunate idea of an emancipation of women. If woman believes she is able to make an impression upon us in daily intercourse by masculine means, if she seeks to impress us by terrifying looks, it has the opposite effect, and the social boorishness arises that has gained so strong a hold at the present time. There is no merit in being polite to a pretty young girl, that is the natural impulse; but the truly refined man is recognized by his ability to be polite to an old lady. And now look into any omnibus you please and see how the men behave to old ladies!

In England family life has always been very healthy. The Englishman shows great respect to women even

formally; the position of woman in society has every liberty, without becoming undisciplined. Add to this the aristocratic right of heredity, which, not of course because of the law, but rather because of an entail which recurs as a matter of custom, restricts the inheritance almost entirely to the eldest son. Thus rich heiresses are a rarity among the higher classes in England, and most marriages are really marriages of inclination; and, as from such in the end the strongest children, morally and physically, proceed, they are to be looked upon as a blessing for State and society. These are comparatively healthy conditions, only spoiled recently by bluestockingdom and the doctrine of emancipation.

Experiments have been made in Canada recently with female suffrage, which can only be characterized as flippancy. They were only attempted because people said to themselves: "This is a stratagem, in order to win the masses." In the exercise of this right by women there are only two alternatives possible. Either the wife or, it may be, the daughter votes as the husband and father, and thereby an unwarranted privilege is granted to married men—or wife and daughter are good-for-nothings; then they vote against the man, and thus the State carries its dispute in

frivolous fashion right into the peace of the home, the very place where we should rest from the noise of political life.

§ 8. *Races, Stocks, Nations.*

We Germans are to-day in an unfortunate position. The time . . . has come for the sub-German peoples to begin to awake to self-assertion. That is justified to a certain extent. It cannot be denied that the behaviour of Peter the Great towards the Russians was violent. If one is Russian oneself, and considers that somewhat higher than Germanism, the reaction that has set in to-day is intelligible. Every nation is in the habit of overrating itself. Without this self-assertion a nation would lack public spirit as well. Fichte says quite correctly: "A nation cannot possibly keep from pride." That is true also of small nations; they are accustomed to exhibit the greater pride the less merit they have to show. Germanism in the Baltic provinces had protected itself by special local privileges, as the Poles in Posen had their separate rights. But the Germans in Livonia have never forfeited their rights by rebellion, they have always been the most loyal subjects possible; the Czar has never had such faithful subjects. Furthermore, these German

Baltic provinces, intrinsically harmless for Czardom, were invaluable for the culture of the Russian empire. The number of natives who have rendered important service in the employment of the Russian State, in the army and the civil service, is simply legion. Russia had also a thousand grounds for sparing Germanism there, especially because it did not cultivate propaganda at all. Now she has taken from them their old aristocratic constitution, and is trying to squeeze them down by force into the democratic pap of despotic Russia; for democratic despotism is the distinguishing mark of the Russian empire. This attempt to un-Germanize a German country, which as a neighbouring country has brought nothing but blessing to the Russian State, is undeniably barbarism. If these inhabitants of the Baltic provinces had not happened to be Germans, bearers of a higher culture; if they had not deserved so much of the State, we should have been obliged to overlook the many ruthless steps of the Russian executive power.

Then, however, the Jews cease to be necessary; the Aryans have themselves become accustomed to the management of money. And now all that is dangerous in this people becomes prominent, the decomposing power of a nation which assumes the mask of different

nationalities. If nations had self-knowledge, even noble Jews would be obliged to confess that there is no room left nowadays for the cosmopolitanism of Judaism: we do not understand of what further use to the world an international Judaism can be. Here we must speak openly, undisturbed by the fact that the Jewish press befouls what is pure historical truth. It can no longer be disputed that Judaism can only play a part if its members decide to become Germans, Frenchmen, or Englishmen, and, with the reservation of old associations, become merged with the nation to which, according to public law, they belong. That is the perfectly moderate and just demand that we Westerners have to make; no nation can permit the Jews to have a double nationality.

But the circumstances are so involved because we have no sure standard by which to compare the Jews who have become merged into the foreign nationality with the others. Baptism alone does not do this. There are unbaptized Jews who are good Germans—I myself have known such Jews—and on the other hand baptized Jews who are not; legally, therefore, we are in a difficult position. If the legislature wished to treat the Jews simply as guests, permitting them to exercise civil trades, but giving them, on the other hand, no political or magisterial rights, that would be an injustice, because this would not reach those we

are aiming at. He who is baptized a Christian cannot be looked upon as a Jew; every legislature must insist on that. So far I see absolutely only one means that we can employ here: real energy of our national pride, which must become a second nature with us, so that we involuntarily reject everything that is strange to the Germanic nature. That holds good of all and sundry; it holds good visiting of theatres and music-halls as well as of newspaper-reading. Where there is Jewish filth soiling our life the German must turn away, and he must accustom himself to speak the truth straight out. If we see an unclean anti-Semitism springing up, the moderate parties are to blame for that.

§ 9. *Castes, Orders, Classes.*

In judging of the historical position of the nobility among the different nations of Europe we must preserve an open mind in order not to admire foreign institutions blindly. Thus the English nobility is admired by our Conservatives; and, considered in a purely social light, it has indeed an excellent organization. Only the eldest son of the family is considered noble; that helps to keep the nobility rich and take away a certain odium from them. His distinguished

social position has apparently in this case nothing that offends, as the other sons sink back into the "commons." When we hear it stated thus, it seems an excellent organization; the only question is whether we Germans, with our different moral and social ideas, can adopt it as it stands. Frederick William IV., it is true, attempted it; after a few months, still in the first year of his reign, he was obliged to withdraw the decrees, because a widespread opinion protested against them. The king's main idea was that the nobility should consist of great landowners alone, and that only those who inherited the land should belong to the nobility; but not the younger sons who had no land. With us Germans, however, the family feeling is so strong that we feel it to be an injustice if the younger son does not occupy the same social position as the elder. Against such views there is absolutely nothing to be done. It is not true that one who has an estate would be, in the eyes of our civilian society, so much more of a gentleman than his brother who has none. At the present time the respect for the ownership of land has sunk much deeper, since so many obviously un-noble elements have acquired great nobles' estates.

If we look more closely, it is clear that in Germany also the bluest blood of the nobility is political in the

highest degree. In a certain sense we must say that no country in the world has so illustrious a nobility as we have. That the order of German princes is, properly speaking, only a high order of nobility, has been evident since we have had an empire. This nobility need fear no comparison. The lower order of nobility is monarchic—that part of it which is worth anything. That is why the Prussian nobility stands so high morally; these very Prussian Junkers of ill repute are the best elements of the German nobility. Every one who is at home in the small German States knows that. In Prussia the Junkers have so long been obliged to learn to be subjects that they find their glory in the service of the Crown. They had first to be humbled by the royal power, but after that they accommodated themselves to circumstances. The families of small nobles, on the contrary, in Saxony and Bavaria have always had something of the parasite about them; they wish to rise by means of the Court like the French Court-nobles.

If we look down into the lowest stratum of society, which is designated nowadays the fourth order, we are confronted by the remarkable phenomenon that these great masses on the one hand contain the worst elements of society—it cannot be otherwise; there must

be a lowest stratum in the life of every civilized people which embraces everything that cannot keep itself above it—and these same classes at the same time carry within themselves the rejuvenating and vivifying energies of all nationality. Every nation is rejuvenated from below upwards; such is the complicated interchange between the classes, that the outworn elements sink from above downwards, while on the other side the young and rejuvenating elements ascend from below. No one knew that better than that glorious man, whom narrow-minded Liberals always call an aristocrat, Goethe. If real democracy consists in the love of mankind, then Goethe is a democratic poet. How truly has he said: "Those whom we call the lowest class are certainly for God the highest class of men." In these simple conditions of life there are preserved among good men a simple strength and purity of feeling, which are so easily lost among the refined.

Long ago Aristotle described the position of this class in the State with antique hardness of heart but with essential correctness: "They are content if they are permitted to occupy themselves with their own affairs." Necessity and sweat in daily life are the most real things for these masses who work with their hands. They wish to be in a tolerable position economically; the ideal energies, of which they are

capable, exhibit themselves in two directions: in a profound religious sentiment and on the other hand in delight in military heroism. Who can picture to himself Jesus or Martin Luther otherwise than as the children of poor parents? Such religious geniuses only arise in the lowest ranks of society. The aristocrat must use violence upon his accustomed views of life in order to come round to the view that we are all God's children. But this feeling will exist very strongly among more humble and upright people, if their feelings are sound.

There lives, further, in the common man a healthy, martial feeling of honour; a delight in heroism lies in his blood. If we seek for the truly national heroes of history, the very highest fame, that unseals the lips of tradition, has nearly always been apportioned to the heroes of war and of religion. The statesman proper, on the other hand, will never be popular. There is only one exception to that rule and it is an apparent one. It is Prince Bismarck. He, however, lives in the memory of the people as a soldier hero, as the iron man with the yellow collar of the Magdeburg cuirassiers; the fancy of the great masses pictures Moltke and Bismarck together as the men who had waged the wars against Austria and France. On the other hand, it is otherwise universally the case that heroes of war and of religion are the really popular heroes;

and, when we know that, we understand how the discontented masses are to be treated. The first thing is the satisfaction of their domestic cares; and then it concerns us to work upon their oppressed minds with the powers of the promise that only religion offers. We must in every possible way promote and cultivate the manly courage and the religious sentiment, which are powerful among the lower classes. Therefore the national armies are a real blessing. To no one is religion more indispensable than to the common man. The unbelieving man of culture must not actually repudiate the moral law, but the unrefined man will lose all morality along with his faith.

§ 10. *Religion.*

If we look at matters in this way, it is evident, that the world of religious sentiment is so entirely separated from the raw atmosphere of the life of the State, that a full understanding can never supervene here. Religious truths are truths of the mind, true as nothing else is for the believing, but altogether nonexistent for the unbelieving. Childhood, which lives for the future, and old age with its quiet contemplativeness are especially accessible to the promises of religion;

to the female mind, also, the profound unrest of an existence without religion is unbearable. In the life of the State, however, it is above all the men who decide; they are the rulers here. The State is guided not by emotions, but by calculating, clear experience of the world; religion wishes to know only what it believes, the State to believe only what it knows. In the ecclesiastical community the subjective conviction of the believing conscience is, simply, everything. The ideal of a religious fellowship is the republic. Its constitution must be so framed, that the changing conviction of the community may find expression: thus in this case again the Evangelical Church stands above the Catholic. It is the other way about in the State. It is in the first instance power; and undoubtedly its ideal is the monarchy, because in it the power of the State expresses itself in an especially decided and consistent way.

§ 11. *The Education of the People.*

It remains to be insisted upon, that the elementary school must give what is positive, and that here all education must rest upon a religious foundation. Thus uniformity, not a blend, is undoubtedly the standard.

It does not follow from this that undenominational schools are to be rejected in every case. In the Polish provinces they are necessary, in order to promote Germanism. We must make German education supreme there; but a purely Catholic school means in Poland and West Prussia a Polish school. He, who will not see that, sacrifices great and real interests of the German nation to love of an abstract theory.

It will always remain an established fact that instruction in Latin and Greek cannot be replaced by anything else whatever. The classical languages have a wealth of German inflections, such as the modern languages no longer possess; English, so worn down is it, has no longer any inflections of the noun. Another advantage of those languages is that usage no longer causes any changes in them. Here the rules are fixed, and that is of great consequence in the case of the undisciplined youthful mind; it must abide by a fixed rule laid down. Add the third advantage, that the finest literature of all time arose in Greece, and that the Latin language possesses a logical force such as no other in the world does, to such a degree that, if we wish to make ourselves particularly clear and plain, we must construe our thoughts in a Latin form of

speech. Then we cannot commit any more errors of thought.

§ 12. *Domestic Economy.*

But, even from a purely theoretical point of view, the idea is quite a mistaken one. Not uniformity, but juxtaposition of large, average and small fortunes is necessary for the health of a nation, for the development in every direction of its material and moral energies. Very small fortunes must be there; otherwise the workers, whom we cannot do without for the satisfaction of our physical needs, would not be found in sufficient numbers. There must be middle classes; in them the real cream of the nation lies, they form the principal foundation of the State. But even moderate fortunes are not sufficient for the great system of credit, and the huge industrial undertakings of our time, which require large capitals in the hands of individuals. For economical production large capitals, when they are in the right hands, are every whit as necessary as a working-class, which must work out of necessity. We know, of course, that the conception of necessity is fortunately a relative one, but it can never die out.

These are unpopular truths at the present time, but

we must constantly declare them anew, for it is established that there can be no civilization without servants, night-watchmen, etc. Whence follows of itself that even theory must wish to place a part of mankind in such a position that they consider the posts of servants and night-watchmen desirable. He who has eyes to see knows that it must remain so, and shall remain so, for all futurity. All this talk of an equal division of all property is therefore absurd from the first, because men are alternately dying or being born every moment, and because no standard could in any case ever be found by which even an approximately equal division of property could be carried out.

What will occupy the State still more, however, in the most immediate future is the too great power of the large capital in its appalling degeneration. A fortune such as the house of Rothschild possesses is in every sense a public calamity. There can in this case be no question of spending the interest; thus the capital increases rapidly, and, what is still worse, these huge fortunes are mostly cosmopolitan and contribute very little to the increase of any nation's prosperity. The slow draining of the national wealth by such immense fortunes, the continuous accumulation of the money in unworthy hands, which we can observe all around us

at the present time: these are phenomena which certainly open out a very gloomy vista into the future. It is very easily conceivable that the State will one day take steps against this unnatural increase of the large capital.

BOOK III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

§ 13. *The Forms of the State.*

We to-day have a very rich experience of monarchies, while Aristotle had only learned to know a few, and some of these far from exemplary. We may therefore say that he has not understood the monarchy, as the Hellenes in general have not understood it. For that reason they start from the belief that the essence of the monarchy lies in the government of one man; then they come naturally to the further question: "How is it that one man can be placed so high above all others?" and they arrive at the conclusion that the republic is the more rational, for only a godlike being can be exalted above all men. Aristotle speaks thus also. Now, that is an entire misconception. We should indeed be Byzantine flatterers if we tried to say that our dynasty of kings was intrinsically superior to all the other families in the country. The position of the Hohenzollerns is not founded upon distinguished personal virtue or judiciousness, but their superiority

consists in the mere fact that they are the kings, that they stand upon their own right, and exercise a right of sovereignty which is not disputed.

§ 14. *The Theocracy.*

The near future will, it is to be hoped, wipe out the disgrace that such a dominion could ever establish itself on European soil. For what has this Turkish empire achieved in three full centuries? It has only destroyed. They have rushed in over the West like a huge avalanche of rubbish, annihilating everything. There is nothing left in Hungary from the hundred and fifty years of their dominion but some mutilations of Christian churches and the warm baths in Buda. We know that it lies in the nature of Theocracy, that it cannot develop beyond a fixed limit. How splendidly did the civilization of the Omayyads flourish in Spain, in Cordova and Granada! At a certain point, however, it too began all at once to become torpid, so that the ruder Christian stocks of the north, who, nevertheless, carried within themselves the Christian capacity for development, gained the upper hand. The Turks have not developed at all, they have always been, by reason of their inborn hatred of thinking, a people of soldiers, and indeed of great bravery, which we must

admire. That is just the misfortune, that a people that could only fulfil its mission as a horde of horsemen has been brought into the enlightenment of the West. What are the celebrated mosques but imitations of the Hagia Sophia? The Turks have only copied that Christian temple. Embroider slippers and cover marble palaces with a kind of lace veil: these things they can do; and they understand perfectly, in especial, how to decorate with ornaments the large halls of state, in which the harem bathes; but real architecture they lack completely. How crazily they have disfigured the Hagia Sophia, that wonderful building in whose regular forms one hears, as it were, the rhythm of the proportions making music! And then, if we enter, what a sight! As Mecca lay in a south-south-easterly direction, they have moved the prayer-niches away from the centre a great distance to the right. And all carpets, all church furniture, are now placed obliquely and turned towards that corner: we have the impression that a crowd of drunk people has turned everything upside-down. That is the way in which Orientals meddle with the Christian world.

Still more ridiculous was the attempt to obtain an entry into Turkey for the constitutional ideas of Western Europe. The presupposition necessary for

a constitutional State is absolutely lacking: a uniform nation. The population does not consist of Ottomans, but of a mixture of Mohamedans and Europeans. Turkey is incorrigible, and she will remain so in spite of all the much-lauded promises of freedom. We only need to observe how outward form proceeds in such cases. With what grotesque ceremonies was the Hatti-sherif of Gulhané proclaimed in 1839! The Grand Signior appears, and all those assembled throw themselves on their bellies. Then the Court astrologer steps forward with his astrolabe to see if Allah has sent the favourable hour; and as Allah has said, "It is time," the reading of the great charter of freedom begins. Such a State will remain what it was, and since something of the old lion is to be observed even yet, and since the army is constantly obtaining fresh and seasoned strength from the Asiatic provinces, it probably will remain until it is driven out of Europe by force. Moltke, who, as is well known, was also in Turkey as a Prussian captain, declared this so long as fifty years ago. It is a system of the universe which is strange to us, and which cannot be reformed according to European ideas, but can only be overthrown. The best picture of this people, which hates thinking, but is experienced, because of long practice, in the art of ruling, is furnished to us by the dogs of Constantinople. They are brave, harmless animals; they sleep

during the day, and at night they perform the duty of cleaning the streets without payment. But if we take one of these dogs into our house and try to train him, he dies out of longing for his accustomed freedom. The Ottoman is like that. Under the tent in the desert he was in his place; that he strayed into the restraint of civilization, is a dispensation that can only end with his destruction.

§ 15. *The Monarchy.*

In contrast to the theocracy, the monarchy acknowledges the secular nature of all executive power. Young nations, it is true, are inclined to trace their kingship back to some divine descent; but the executive power, once established, is always of a secular character. It is even conscious of this itself and of its difference from priesthood, and the "by the grace of God" is only an expression of humility and piety. No mystic spiritual power is meant by it, but it is to be recognized in humility that it is an unsearchable dispensation of Providence, if this particular family has raised itself above all others in the country. The monarchy, of course, has need of devoutness in a very especial degree, for the idea that he stands so high above all other men may actually unsettle the brain of the ruler,

unless he is filled with pious humility and recognizes that his power is the dispensation of God, and that he must submit himself to this dispensation. But all this does not invalidate the rule that this executive power is secular and will be secular. The truly monarchical State does not put forward the claim to meddle with the handiwork of the Godhead.

It lies, moreover, in the exalted position of the monarch to see further than ordinary men. The ordinary man surveys only a small circle of real life. We can recognize this especially clearly in the involuntary class-prejudices of the average man. There are prejudices of the middle classes and of the learned professions, as well as those of the nobility; they do not see the whole of society, but only a small section. On the contrary, it is clear that a monarch will learn to know more of the aggregate of the national life than the individual subject, and that he is in a position to judge the relations of the different forces in society more correctly than the average man can. This is true above all in regard to foreign countries. The king can judge much more clearly how things really stand in the world without than the individual subject or even a republican party-government. A policy

reckoning far into the future will only be possible for him who really stands at the centre.

... Generally speaking, we must call a fixed hereditary succession a *conditio sine qua non* of the monarchic form of the State. Add to this that we see certain peculiarities of character to be hereditary in reigning families. It is, of course, not a peculiarity of monarchic families alone to remain like themselves through the centuries; it is the case everywhere. On the whole, we may say of the Hohenzollerns, a gifted race, showing strong individual diversities, that they have nevertheless been, with few exceptions, simple natures. What a plain, homely understanding, always seeing what lies near at hand, does Frederick the Great display, in spite of all his genius! Certain views become, by reason of a long historical experience, the habit of a ruling family: think of the efforts of the Hohenzollerns to form the Union. Originally it was merely a makeshift, in order to secure themselves. Through his going over to the Reformed faith the monarch with his house had joined the small minority; he had therefore to try to find a meeting-ground in some form or other.

Undoubtedly, there also lies in this continuity of family inheritance the danger of monotony and torpidity. There exist such unintellectual reigning families

that, as in the case of the English Georges, we can hardly distinguish one king from the other. Or look at the portraits of the Hapsburg rulers: everywhere the same touch of spiritual dulness in the faces; they have all been parson-kings. The house of Holstein is also remarkable in all its branches. The Oldenburg Holsteiners can only be distinguished by the fact that the lower Frederick always follows the higher Christian. The fourth Christian alone was able to unseal the lips of the Muse, and lives on in the lasting remembrance of his people. It is he of whom the national anthem sings: "King Christian stood by the lofty mast." Nevertheless, the dynasty was loved in all its generations. They had nothing objectionable in all their uniform mediocrity.

This danger of torpidity would be still greater for the monarchy if human nature did not here, as everywhere, work against it. The natural opposition between the younger and older generations, which is found in all ranks of society, shows itself particularly strong in these high places. There is no human calling which could be more exposed to the most subtle moral temptations than that of the heir to the throne in a great empire. It is an old experience that those very monarchs who are true to their duty, and powerful, have a great jealousy of their successors: they do not wish to let him who comes after them have a peep

into the kitchen. The Crown Prince was always shoved gently aside by the Emperor William I. Being so highly placed, and as a rule quite without influence, the heir is provoked to criticism, which expresses itself now in evil, now in nobler forms. Never yet in the case of the Hohenzollerns has a father been of like mind with his son. That is the corrective which Nature applies in this instance, fortunately for us, against the danger of one-sided torpidity. Therefore, monarchies have never degenerated into so great a monotony as theocratic States. The personality of the ruler in its individuality has always made itself felt anew as a rejuvenating influence.

. . : Of monarchies it holds good in the highest degree that kings may themselves become their own worst enemies. For in the fact that a single man is placed so high above all mortals there lies an immense temptation to arrogance of all kinds; there is an imminent danger that the personality of the king of the moment, with his caprices and his human limitations, may be confounded with the crown itself, and that thus a self-deification may arise which will have a demoralizing effect. If everything that passes through the mind of such a prince must forthwith become law, the monarchy becomes a caricature and an agitation begins

among all noble, free spirits; and such monarchs must then rely upon their enemies, for their friends forsake them. On the other hand, in this event also it very often does not matter what the monarch is in reality, but what he appears to be to his people. When I consider what changes have come about in impressions of monarchs in my lifetime alone! Frederick William IV. was as much overrated in the first period of his reign as his great brother was underrated.

If, on the contrary, the king is profoundly imbued with the consciousness of his exalted duty, then it is glorious to see how the high office educates its holder. What examples of such kingly men Prussia possesses in Frederick II. and King William! Let us follow the life of Frederick, who at his latter end was the greatest of all the monarchs of the earth. At first he was still an excitable half-poet, full of poetical whims and fancies, always with a tinge of sentimentalism; on the same day he gives the order for the inroad into Silesia and celebrates in an ode the quiet peace of country life. And then how all at once the hero in him breaks through, and thereafter with the course of years his kingly sense becomes ever stronger! In his old age he lives and moves entirely in the thought of his States; all personal likes and dislikes disappear before

that. In his last period he becomes, as it were, impersonal; he now thinks only of exercising the justice of the king. That is the process of development of a monarch of a grand type. In Emperor William the like is to be observed. And the evening of his life was more cheerful than that of his great predecessor. In his last years he appears already as if transfigured. What did he still wish and strive for for himself? Nothing whatever; he became quite identified with the idea of his political calling.

Where the crown is in tolerable hands, especially in the hands of thoroughly modest natures, even when they are moderately gifted, their natural inherent strength will be shown in this respect also, that there will exist an especially good understanding between the army and the king. In the army, above all, every one desires a final, supreme, unconditioned will, and, as the king stands above all social oppositions, he is also especially well fitted to realize in practice the idea of the power of the State by means of his leadership of the army. The king is the born leader of the army; and, if he is also that in reality, every one has the feeling that the monarchy confronts us in its finest bloom and maturity. The organization of the army is undoubtedly an easier task for the

monarchy than for the republic. It is easier to take the oath of allegiance to a visible head of the army than to an abstraction. Moreover, the king can use this terrible weapon, the army, without any internal danger to the State. In republics, on the contrary, the danger is always threatening, that a victorious general may misuse the army for selfish political aims. Even in Washington's army there were attempts of this kind. In the France of to-day things are quite plain in this respect. The conqueror of Germany would at once be made emperor of France. Therefore the republic must often have recourse to artificial means; Venice in her later period had always foreign *condottieri*.

§ 16. *The Older Forms of the Monarchy.*

... Present-day Russia has shown us that in that State sheer madness is still possible. Such a suicidal act as the uprooting of Germanism in the Baltic provinces has seldom been seen in the history of the world. These Germans were only too faithful. What a part they have played in Russian history! Almost one out of three of the famous statesmen or generals of Russia has been a native of the Baltic provinces. Besides, there are the ethnographical conditions. The

Baltic provinces are not German at all, they have only a thin crust of German patricians and noblemen above the mass of Lithuano-Finnish original inhabitants. Thus in their case a revolt of the Germans was not to be thought of. And these faithful provinces, to which Russia owes so much, were ill-treated and mutilated with a barbarity without parallel. The complete expulsion of the Germans from Russia is indeed unthinkable, for then the work of the State would not proceed; Russia has not enough capable Muscovites. And yet there is this raging hatred of the Germans. After a new change of government we shall perhaps experience a reversion to the European. But in such a spasmodic for and against a great State can hardly proceed permanently.

The recipe of the German liberals for all abuses is of course a transition to constitutional forms of the State. Whether it will come to this some day, who can prophesy? But a constitution would be, to begin with, a very doubtful benefit. Russia requires social reforms before everything else. Serfdom must be quite abolished, so that the peasant may acquire property; the wretched system of national education must be reformed from top to bottom. Now, if the question be asked: "Who are the natural enemies of these reforms?" then the answer is: "The great land-owners." But a Parliament in Russia can only be

composed of great landowners and some representatives of the cities; it would thus be reactionary in the very worst sense, and would only restrain Czardom. On the other hand, educated Russians had the feeling that they lacked a constitution so early as the period from 1815 to 1830, when the grand-duchy of Warsaw rejoiced in its constitution, and likewise later, when the small Balkan States, which Russia had helped to separate from Turkey, all created for themselves the most delightful national representation possible. Every State had to have its Skupshtina. They shoot and thrash one another there; nevertheless it is proved within a small compass, that parliamentary forms can be realized even among Slavs and Wallachs.

Thus many momenta may by pressure bring about the venturing of the experiment one day in Russia, although success is so doubtful. But we must not underestimate the immense vital energy of the Russian empire even in its present condition. A capacity for assimilation of the very highest grade is a universal characteristic of history with which we must reckon. If ever any State had, then Russia has what the Americans call a great destiny. Its civilizing mission in Asia is unmistakable, and there it has huge tasks still to accomplish. The danger to Europe lies in the fact that the State is filled, because of its successes in Asia, with a consciousness of victory, which it has not

earned at all. Its frontiers to the west are of such a kind that it cannot be attacked there. There has therefore developed among the Russians a megalomania, which wishes to appear on the scene in the west also, as conqueror and ruler. The fancy of a Russian lieutenant of the guard does not stick at a little military promenade, taking one part of the army to the Hindus and the other over Berlin and Vienna to Constantinople.

In Asia the Russians are as a Caucasian people, which, however, still lives at the same time under half-oriental forms of the State, the true bearers of civilization; in Europe, on the contrary, Russia's example teaches us as clearly as day, that a return to pure absolutism is no longer possible in any country.

§ 17. *The Constitutional Monarchy.*

If we sum up all these English conditions, then we understand how Montesquieu could declare that the ruling spirit of a constitutional monarchy must be mistrust; that terrible doctrine which would base a noble form of the State upon one of the most hateful impulses of man. But it is still at this day a dogma of all radical parties, even if they do not dare to announce it in plain words. And even my dear

teacher Dahlmann said that political freedom in constitutional States had perhaps less to fear from mediocre monarchs on the throne than from the genius of great men. Thus could a noble, intelligent man speak, as if genius, which is ever a blessing from Heaven, must become a public danger.

Yet it is quite evident that we cannot wish, even if it happened to be possible, to transfer to other States without more ado a kingship ossified by peculiar historical circumstances, such as this English one. Healthy human reason tells us that these political institutions are the best, which achieve most in the most capable hands. He who maintains, therefore, that a kingship must be so arranged that it can bear mediocrities best, is talking out of topsy-turvydom. The whole education of English princes is, of course, directed towards the object, which it has attained with wonderful success, that the hereditary nullity of the house of Guelph should be perpetuated. None of those who can hope for the throne is a soldier in the full sense of the word. And things are already so arranged that we, without being prophets, can say in advance that the Guelph hereditary characteristics will continue in the next two generations of the house of Coburg. They belong to the nature of the English State; but we Germans do not wish to depart from simple human intelligence, and do not wish to propose

to our nation that they should have a healthy leg cut off and exchange it for a wonderfully executed artificial one. We have made the trial: our constitutional monarchy is of such a nature that it achieves the most under great monarchs. The constitutional monarchy is not intended to rob the kingship of all significance; it must rather keep it fresh and living even among a politically mature people. With us the kingship is almost the only force of political tradition which unites our present with the past: shall we wish for ourselves English Georges instead of our famous house of Hohenzollern? We have such a proud monarchic history that a Prussian may well say: "The best monarch is just good enough for us." According to our constitution, the monarch alone is vested with the power of the State; and he who maintains the contrary must prove what he maintains against our constitution on the basis of alien and peculiar conditions which have become historical.

We have, of course, adopted many inessential trifles from England. Thus with us also the name of the king must not be mentioned in Parliament. The English—they have always been great in such kinds of flattery—declared that the name of the king should no more be taken in vain than the name of God. The will

of this Guelph royalty, whose first representative did not understand his country's language, and thus could not preside at any council of ministers, is no longer of any account; it matters not at all what Queen Victoria thinks about a political question. And that is to be a model for our country, where the king understands German very well! In Germany the will of the king still means something very real. That is true above all of Prussia, which alone has still a real monarch, who is also entirely independent of any higher power. Here a minister must not, in presence of Parliament, hide himself like a coward behind the monarch; but, if in a given case he declares: "Don't decide that, gentlemen; I tell you beforehand we cannot carry it with his Majesty"; if a minister says that, it is impossible to see why he ought not to have said it.

§ 18. *Tyranny and Cæsarism.*

A nation which takes so cowardly a view of the world is ripe for despotism. The reproach of passion for novelty, which we like to make against the French, is, if we look more closely, little justified politically. In France things have not altered these last hundred years so much as with us in Germany; the revolutions always affected the heads of the State alone. He who

examines impartially, and does not allow himself to be deceived by phrases, must say that that country makes the most harmonious impression, as regards healthy State-development, under the first and third Napoleons. Nothing is said against Bonapartism with moral catch-words. It, and not the present state of the bureaucratic republic, corresponds undeniably in France to the laws of political logic. The form of the State in that country is still based upon the institutions of the First Consul. The whole sub-structure of the State, the fixed, centralized hierarchy of a thoroughly despotic officialdom, which takes from the subjects all trouble of self-administration, and permits them only to criticize and pay taxes, and at the worst to help themselves by a revolution: this constitution requires also a despot at the head of it. The republic has only lasted because a new Bonaparte who shall beat the Germans, has not yet been found.

§ 19. *The Aristocratic Republic.*

There is a strong quality of energy, of majesty, in the whole Venetian organization. The king-craft of that city is unique, the wonderful gifts, the penetrating knowledge of mankind of her ambassadors; but equally unmistakable is a quality of contempt for mankind,

especially for all men of talent who had no blue blood in their veins. That was the real canker of that aristocratic republic, that it did not, like Rome, reserve to itself the possibility of admitting *homines novi* into the ruling order. In earlier times capable energies had been assimilated from outside; a whole series of Venetian families was originally Dalmatian. This shrewdness was quite neglected later; in the end Venice came to ruin through the caste-like isolation of the ever decreasing order of rulers, the intermarrying and the physical and moral degeneration which resulted therefrom. How low they fell, these illustrious houses! A typical representative of the utterly degenerate nobility is the last doge Manin. What a pitiful part he played when Bonaparte came in 1797 to overturn the old Queen of the Adriatic with what was nothing more nor less than a kick! That was the ignominious fall of a State that had once ruled the whole East. Then, when in 1848 great historical reminiscences flared up once more, when the republic of San Marco came to life again for a short time, it seemed a crowning insult of Fate, that a Manin again appeared at its head. But he sprang from one of the small Jew families of Venice. Each of the old noble houses had a following of little families of clients about it, who also frequently adopted the name of the ruling family. From such a family

sprang the great democrat, Daniele Manin, whose defence of Venice against the Austrians is among the most exalted feats of our century.

§ 20. *The Democratic Republic.*

As the theocracy is the drowsiest, the monarchy the most many-sided, the aristocracy the most methodical, so is the democracy the most generally intelligible and most popular among the forms of the State. The fundamental principle on which it is based is the idea of the natural equality of everything that bears a human visage; this idea has something exalted about it, and it is very easy to understand why it has so often had an intoxicating effect. We know well that it is only half true, and never entirely to be realized, but it is deeply rooted in human nature. That the idea of inequality is equally true, that we are all, indeed, equal as men, but unequal as individuals, the ordinary view of things cannot recognize. The ordinary human intelligence speaks of equality alone. At a certain stage of the civilization of the people, therefore, democracy can have an effect in promoting culture; it is, if at all well administered, the most popular form of the State, and, in countries where it prevails, is looked upon as so self-evident that other

forms are considered to be nonsensical or gross tyranny. However different the character it may assume according to social conditions, it always retains the principal quality, that its ideal is the δήμος μόναρχος. The people must really be the sole ruler, and the object is in such a manner to extend the rights of the people that ultimately general equality shall exist, at least upon paper.

Artificial democracies are relatively more frequent than artificial monarchies and aristocracies. A nobility cannot be made, if it is not there already; as little can a dynasty be created at will; on the contrary, it is quite possible, by means of an over-hasty revolution, to introduce democratic forms even where they have no natural foundation, because of the customs of the country, or because of the great inequalities of social conditions. And these democratic forms may then persist, because they are very elastic, and because an aristocratic element can easily accommodate itself to them. It is so even yet in Bern. Or look at present-day France: under a purely democratic constitution there is what is in point of fact a complete plutocracy; the oligarchic power of a few great banking houses, which tacitly make use of the democratic forms, in order to exploit them for their own objects.

... In democracies, on the contrary, a rigid denominationalism is the rule, and for domestic life in North America this denominational narrow-mindedness is in fact a real blessing. Here the Sabbath in its ghastly form is really necessary. To our German sentiment nothing is more horrible than such a day of rest, of complete inactivity, every week. We incline to the opposite fault, to a Sunday of dissipation; a stricter celebration of the Sunday can do no harm in Germany. But God preserve us from the English-American Sabbath! One must have completely exhausted oneself in every muscle and nerve for the past six days, in order to feel that this absolute laziness on the seventh day is a release. The severe and rigid, altogether narrow-minded ecclesiasticism of the Americans, which is so repulsive to us more liberal Germans, is thus shown to be a practical necessity. We come to recognize that democracy must in any case rest upon the foundation of a very strong religious morality, if it is not to get quite out of control.

§ 21. *Confederacy of States and Federal State.*

We have to-day on the Scandinavian peninsula the same relations as those between Belgium and Holland after 1815. The political connection of these two

peoples also looked wonderfully well on the map, and was yet in reality intolerable. Similarly to-day with the union between Sweden and Norway. Norway democratizes in the most repulsive way; it is a people of peasants, where every churl is a churl, each as coarse and clownish as the other, and then on the top, with this rude peasantry as a foundation, an immense refinement of city life. Then very naturally there arises an over-refined, decadent literature; such spirits as Ibsen are intelligible on this soil. Look at Sweden, on the other hand, with her recollections of the days when she was a Great Power; the good Swedish soldiers even to-day, and in Christiania the ludicrous figures with their *bersagliere*-hats, who are called soldiers also—the sharp contrast is everywhere as clear as noonday. In spite of this, however, we find in Norway a capacity for the conduct of trade which deserves admiration; Norway has a larger mercantile fleet than Germany. Of course the configuration of the coast is such that intercourse between different places in that country can only be carried on by ship. In contrast to this, Sweden's industries have achieved little so far. The Norwegian is at the present time filled with a profound, democratic, peasant's hatred of Sweden, and everything seems to indicate that the attempt to separate the two kingdoms will be made.

§ 22. *The Empire.*

... He who judges impartially must say that, since the Great Elector, the political history of Germany is entirely contained in Prussia. Every clod of land which was lost through the fault of the old Empire, and was won back again, was acquired by means of Prussia. In that State lay thenceforth the political energies of the German nation just as certainly as she did not contain in her for a long time its ideal energies, in fact almost thrust them from her. The new Germany, after the confusion of the War of Liberation, was at first only a loose juxtaposition of the small monarchic States, which in that immense fluctuation had remained alone upon the battle-field. And the creative work of the Prussian State begins anew. All the politically real content of the history of the league was enacted in Prussia. On Prussian soil that arming of the nation began which was later to become the lot of all Germany; through it the eight provinces of Prussia grew simultaneously into one whole. The proof was given by the facts that an executive power which was in a position to unite Trier and Tilsit in internal peace, would also have the power to unite and to protect all Germany. And soon the Prussian Customs-Union began to trace out the real frontiers of Germany

as opposed to the real foreign countries. The black-and-yellow boundary-posts with the nefarious double-eagle remained outside. It had been our misfortune through many centuries, that no one knew where Germany stopped. The time was now to come at last in which the single-headed eagle of the old emperor, which the eastern march of Prussia alone had kept for itself, won its victories over the double-eagle which had so deeply injured and insulted us.

For the improvement of centralization a real capital would also be very necessary to the empire, while the federal republics, as we have seen, exhibit the opposite of such a need. Although the Berliner is the most unbearable person in all Germany, yet Berlin is bound to become much greater yet, must attract to itself much more of the nation's energies. Before 1866 there were very many worthy German patriots who with thorough earnestness wished German unity, but, from an intelligible ill-will against Berlin, wished Brunswick or Hildesheim or Nuremberg for the capital. These are aberrations which are no longer understood at the present day, but they had at that time gained a very firm footing. This capital of the Jewish newspaper-press will, of course, never be able to become the centre of German national life. Add to this, that

Berlin is also too unæsthetic to become the centre of the noblest civilizing activities of the German people. A true artist cannot live here. How one can be a poet and conceive the idea of living in Berlin has always been incomprehensible to me. It will always be the case that towns like Munich and Dresden will offer more stimulus for artistic souls than Berlin can ever give. On that account also the empire, fortunately, on the whole, for art itself, has left the care of artistic matters to the individual States, showing in this case a justified particularism.

For the rest, however, it is evident, that the city which is once recognized as the capital must be as rich in spiritual energies as is possible at all. It was a grave error of federalist policy, which can now, alas, no longer be retrieved, to remove the supreme court of the empire to Leipzig. Every member of the supreme court feels as if he were a fish out of water. In all really united States the seat of the highest court has always been the capital. And for the life of commerce, also, an even greater centralization in Berlin is unavoidable. It is, indeed, very evident what a power of attraction the Imperial Bank and the other Berlin banks have exercised. And this must remain so. If Germany is to become a real monarchy, the capital of its emperor must also become the capital of the nation; this centralization lies in the nature of things.

BOOK IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE

§ 23. *The Organization of the Army.*

EVEN he who looks upon the army as an evil must consider it in any case as a necessary evil. If the State itself is necessary and rational, it follows that it must maintain itself as against other States. We shall see, however, in addition, that an efficient and powerful equipment of the army is also the basis of political freedom, that consequently the States are by no means to be commiserated that have a powerful, well-organized army. In this very domain theory removed from actual life has constantly suffered ludicrous defeats from the power of facts. Every one who calls himself liberal-minded talks of the ideal belief that the States were hastening towards universal disarmament. But what does the history of our century teach? The very opposite; armament becomes ever stronger and heavier, and this phenomenon is exhibited in every State without exception, and cannot therefore rest upon an accident. The fact is, a radical error lies in this whole

liberal conception. The State is no Academy of Arts, still less a Stock Exchange; it is power, and therefore it contradicts its own nature if it neglects the army.

In this case also the very peculiar circumstances of England have had a misleading effect upon the theories of the Continent. England is in military respects in a very abnormal position. She can confine herself to her fleet as her national weapon, and only requires to give secondary consideration to the army, since she has learned to renounce conquests on the Continent. The godly dragoons of Oliver Cromwell were the most glorious and best army that England has ever possessed, an army worthy of admiration as regards technical skill and moral discipline, but these troops belonged to a religious sect, and only represented a part of the nation. England was forced by means of it into a régime which suited only that one republican party. The country, however, was at that time still monarchically inclined, as the Restoration shortly afterwards showed. The opinions of the English regarding the army spring from those experiences of Puritan rule. At that time the old liberties of the country were enslaved and trodden upon by a continued state of martial law; England lay at the feet of the army. Cromwell could not govern the country otherwise than through his major-generals;

the first business of the Restoration was the disbanding of these godly regiments.

Since then there has been a fixed opinion in England that the army was a tool of the State, which could be used even against the will of the nation; and then, when a second revolution set up a mock royalty by the grace of Parliament, the Mutiny Act was introduced under William III. It runs something like this: "Whereas the condition of a standing army is against the law of this country, but as, in consideration of the preservation of the balance of power in Europe and in order to keep the Colonies in order, it is expedient to call out so many thousand men, the Crown is hereby empowered to call out this number, and the soldiers are under the Mutiny Act placed outside of civil law." You see at once the ludicrous contrast to Germany. With us the institution of the army is really a consequence of the laws. The Defence Act of 1814, one of the grandest memories of Prussia, forms the foundation of a comprehensive legislation. With us the army is thus placed upon a legal foundation, and is not, as in England, an anomaly.

For it is an advantage to a nation when it has a strong and well-organized army, not only because the army is intended to serve as an instrument for foreign

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policy, but because a noble nation with a glorious history can employ the army for a very long time as a dormant weapon, and because it forms a school for the peculiarly manly virtues of the people, which so easily become lost in an age of profit and enjoyment. Of course, we must admit that there are finely-strung, refined, artistic natures that cannot endure military discipline. A perverted view of universal military service often emanates from such people. In these great matters, however, we must not judge according to exceptional natures, but according to the old rule: "*Mens sana in corpore sano.*" This bodily strength is in times like ours especially significant. It is a defect of English civilization that it does not know universal military service. This defect is to some extent remedied by the fact that the fleet is so powerfully developed, and, on the other hand, the continual petty warfare in its numberless colonies employs and keeps fresh the manly energies of the nation. That a great bodily robustness is still to be found in England is partly connected with this constant fighting in the colonies. But if we look more attentively, a great defect is disclosed. The lack of chivalry in the English character, which contrasts so strikingly with the naïve loyalty of the Germans, is connected with the fact that in that country men do not seek bodily exercise in the use of the noble weapons, but in the

accomplishments of boxing, swimming and rowing. Certainly these exercises have their value, but it is obvious that this whole class of athletic sports breeds the athletic spirit, with its coarseness, and a superficial mind, whose sole endeavour is always to win the first prize.

It remains the normal and rational course when a great nation embodies and develops in an organized army the nature of the State, which is precisely power, by means of its physical strength. And, as we have lived in a warlike age, the over-nice, philanthropic way of looking at these things has retreated more into the background, so that, with Clausewitz, we again look upon war as the forcible continuation of policy. All the pipe-of-peace-smokers in the world will not bring matters so far that the political powers will at any time be of one mind, and, if they are not, the sword alone can decide between them. We have learned to know the moral majesty of war in the very thing that appears brutal and inhuman to superficial observers. That one must overcome the natural feelings of humanity for the sake of the fatherland, that in this case men murder one another who have never harmed one another before and who perhaps esteem one another highly as chivalrous enemies, that is at the first glance the awfulness of war, but at the same time its greatness also. A man must sacrifice not only his life, but

also natural, profoundly justified feelings of the human soul; he must yield up his whole ego to a great patriotic idea: that is the moral exaltedness of war. If we pursue this thought further we recognize that war, with all its sternness and roughness, also weaves a bond of love between men, since here all class-distinctions vanish, and the risk of death knits man to man. He who knows history knows also that it would positively be a mutilation of human nature if we tried to banish war out of the world. There is no freedom without warlike strength which is ready to sacrifice itself for freedom. It must be repeated again and again that scholars, when they consider these things, proceed from the tacit assumption that the State is only destined to be an Academy of Arts and Sciences. It must be that too, but that is not its first mission. If a State neglects its physical energies in favour of its spiritual, then it goes to the wall.

If the army is the organized political strength of the State, then that organization can only be power and have no will of its own, for it is intended to execute the will of the head of the State in unconditional obedience. This subjection of its own will to that of the head of the State is a very stern requirement; that must not be denied. But it is obvious,

that the political freedom of a people rests upon this very demand, which all radical talkers decry as reactionary. If the army had a will of its own, all political security would cease. There is no more terrible plague conceivable than an army that debates and splits itself into parties; the fate of Spain is in this connection a deterrent example. How much that country suffered under the army, which had always a will of its own and took the side, now of Carlos, now of the virtuous Isabella! Only the unconditioned severity of military discipline is a protection against such political dangers.

In this energy and firmness of obedience lies the honour of the soldier. Therefore the unconditional obedience, which is with us developed almost to sternness, is a glory and a sign of the efficiency of our army organization. The contempt, with which among radicals this dog-like obedience is so often spoken of, proves itself to be pure illusion. The training in the army is especially suited just for the building-up of character. Old, efficient officers have, above all, well-moulded characters, and in this respect are often to be placed higher than the average scholar, for scholars have much less opportunity of forming their characters. Goethe's immortal saying in his "Tasso" expressed the

truth in this connection. Silent obedience to superiors, and at the same time strict discipline with inferiors demand an independence of character which is very highly to be appraised. Our Prussian generals have never been anything else than liberal-minded men.

The example of the German national army has had an irresistible effect upon the rest of Europe. Everything that was formerly said in mockery of it has proved itself fallacious. It was the rule abroad to look down with shrugging of the shoulders upon the Prussian *Landwehrs* and the Prussian children's army. How differently have things turned out! It has been plainly shown that in war the moral factors have more weight than technical training; and it has been shown further that a moral deterioration goes hand in hand with the increasing technical experience of the barracks. The old sergeants of France were not in the least superior, as the French expected, to the German troops. We may declare that the problem of training in arms and turning to real account the energies of the nation was first undertaken in thorough earnestness by Germany. We possess in our army a characteristic, necessary continuation of the school-system. For many men there is no better means of training; for them drilling, compulsory cleanliness and severe dis-

cipline are physically and morally indispensable in a time like ours, which unchains all spirits. Carlyle prophesied that the Prussian idea of universal liability of service would make the round of the world. Since in 1866 and 1870 the Prussian army-organization stood its trial so brilliantly, almost all the other great States of the Continent have tried to imitate it.

In all these organizings of the army we were until lately the leaders of the other nations. Only recently has the over-straining of military strength in the neighbouring States become so great that Germany sees herself compelled likewise, and this time in imitation of the foreign countries, to go still further. There is a last limit provided by the nature of things, and here the immense physical strength of the Germanic race will itself look to it, that we always retain a considerable advantage over the less prolific nations. The French have come close to their extreme limit; the Germans have in this respect a much greater margin.

You must realize clearly once more how these new formations of the army affect the waging of war. On the whole the tendency of the system is a peaceful one. A whole nation in arms is dragged out of its social employments into a frivolous war with much more difficulty than a conscript army. Wars become

fewer and shorter, but at the same time also bloodier. The desire to get home again will give a strong impulse forwards. The frame of mind of the Prussian soldiers in the summer of 1866, which expressed itself in the wish: "Let us push on quickly to the Danube, so that we can get home soon again," is to be looked upon as the normal wish of a brave and at the same time peacefully inclined national army. That bold method of making war, which seeks as a matter of principle to thrust into the enemy's heart, is nowadays taken as self-evident. We may say that with such a national army, when the nation looks back upon a glorious history, nothing is really impossible; the experiences of our two last wars, especially the battles of Königgrätz and Mars-la-Tour, have proved that. We saw in the battle of Sadowa that fourteen Prussian battalions held their ground against perhaps forty-two Austrian, and the French war showed us a whole series of decisive battles fought with reversed front, the loss of which would have driven us back into the heart of the enemy's country. The task of sparing an army recedes quite into the background, in the case of a modern national army, as compared with the greater and more peremptory task of destroying the enemy. The danger of desertion does not come into consideration here at all; the army can be quartered everywhere.

I shall in conclusion only point out shortly that the fleet is beginning to-day to gain increased importance, not specially for European war—no one believes any longer that a fight between Great Powers can be decided nowadays by naval battles—but rather for the protection of trade and of colonies. The domination of the transatlantic countries will be now the first task of European battle-fleets. For, as the aim of human culture will be the aristocracy of the white race over the whole earth, the importance of a nation will ultimately depend upon what share it has in the domination of the transatlantic world. Therefore the importance of the fleet has again grown greater in our days.

§ 24. *The Administration of the Law.*

Finally, the necessity is clear that the administration of the law should be accessible to all, not only in name, but also in deed. In this respect England stands as far behind the Continent as it has outstripped us in other respects. A lawsuit in England is so dear that it is only possible for the rich man. The small farmer cannot raise an action against his superior, because the costs are beyond his means. In this aristocratic distortion of life lies a fundamental

fault of the English State-organization. For it is obvious that such a state of affairs is a radical error, that the State must intervene with its means, in order to make it possible for the poor man to carry on a lawsuit. Where the administration of the law is not approximately accessible to all, its effectiveness cannot be sound.

As in all human affairs, there must also be in every system of punishment a last limit, a ne plus ultra that no punishment can overstep. Thus even from the point of view of pure theory the necessity of the death-penalty is postulated; it is, as the ultimate punishment on earth, the indispensable keystone of every ordered system of criminal law. No apparent reasons which are alleged against it can withstand any serious criticism. We blush that men should maintain that the State commits a wrong when it attacks the life of the criminal. The State, which has the right to sacrifice for its own protection the flower of its youth, is to feel so nice a regard for the life of a murderer! We must rather allow unreservedly to the State the right to make away with men who are undoubtedly injurious to the common weal. Accept this also as true, that the death punishment must be permitted to the army in time of war, even by those people who at

other times think to dispose of it by phrases. If a deserter cannot be shot forthwith, then war is not possible. And yet a deserting soldier may have many moral grounds of excuse in his favour which a common assassin cannot adduce.

That the powers that be must bear the sword is a biblical expression which runs deep in the blood of the honest man; if this truth is to be banished out of the world, great wrong is done to the simple moral feeling of the people. The ultimate problems of the moral life are to be solved in the domain of the practical, not of the theoretical, reason. The conscience of every earnest man demands that blood be atoned by blood, and the common man must simply grow doubtful of the existence of justice on earth, if this last and highest punishment is not inflicted. Picture to yourself a murderer of the type of the Australian murderers, whose murdering runs in the blood, who is condemned to penal servitude for life. He breaks out, murders again, and returns in quiet contentment to the same prison, since the State can inflict no other punishment. Does such a State not do violence to every moral feeling? It makes itself ridiculous and contemptible if it cannot finally dispose of the criminal. There must be a limit for mercy and indulgence, as for the law, a last limit at which the State says: "This is the end, humanity is no longer possible here." It must be

possible to inflict at last a punishment beyond which there is nothing, and that is the punishment of death.

To this far-reaching privilege of the presiding judge there is added before everything in England the unanimity of the jury, while in France, where, since the Revolution, the English trial by jury has been adopted, but at the same time mutilated, conclusions by majority were introduced. Most certainly the English procedure in this respect is the only proper one. By conclusions of a majority the guilt or innocence of a prisoner is as little decided as a religious or scientific problem. The question, "Has A murdered B?" cannot be answered by the vote of a majority. The demand for unanimity is, on the whole, in spite of its severity, fully justified, for here strength of character can be shown. How often does it happen that a single juryman influences the waverers because he has an inner conviction of the correctness of his opinion! The English have held to this principle to this day with an energy which redounds very greatly to their honour. We, on the contrary, have still far too much respect for the moral cowardice which plays so great a part in this trial-by-jury system. It is much too pleasant for many men to allow themselves to be outvoted. There are such natures everywhere, and among

the very people who call themselves liberal-minded. Our liberals are true types of men who like to allow themselves to be outvoted. The juryman is more than any other exposed to this moral danger of the temptation to say "no" in the silent hope of being outvoted; therefore the stern English principle of unanimity is altogether to be approved.

§ 25. *The Finances of the State.*

All this was changed by the gigantic convulsions of the Napoleonic wars; all States were now compelled to contract war-loans. All emerged from the huge combat laden with heavy debts, and in Germany the opinion very naturally developed itself, that it was best for a State, just as for a private individual, to have no debts at all, and that consequently States in times of peace should conduct their affairs economically and gradually pay off all war-time debts. This view found its theoretical expression in Nebenius's classic, "Public Credit" (1820). In it the most intelligent of the financiers of Baden at that time makes the assertion, that the debt of the State is the worm that gnaws at the roots of the tree of policy; and that it ought to be gradually paid off as soon as possible.

This Philistine doctrine found approval among the

honest, thrifty Prussian officialdom of the old school, and our national debt legislation of 1820 started from the hope that we would succeed in paying off by 1860 the whole of the national debt, as the extinction took place according to a fixed plan. But then the discovery was presently made that States which had a much greater national debt, such as France and England, were increasing in prosperity still faster than Prussia. England had the largest national debt of all the countries of Europe, and, although little was paid off, its wealth was growing and growing beyond measure. Thus, after the extinction of the Prussian national debt had continued for a number of years, the old minister Rother himself became perplexed. In 1843 he drew up a memorial in which he submitted to Frederick William IV. that they ought not to continue too long with the extinction of the national debt. In 1852 it would amount to only 100 million dollars; then they must stop, as it ought not to drop below that. There were capitalists in Prussia who wished to invest their money safely somewhere, and who would then go abroad. This representative of the old school of Prussian officials had thus learned by experience the hollowness of that theory. But, that the national debt must even be considerably increased again, he did not see yet; such insight was too far removed from the views of the period.

In contrast to the war-loan, which only attracts voluntary capital, the war-tax takes capital everywhere by compulsion, even in places where it is not available, and in places where it perhaps brings in ten per cent. So we arrive at the result that an intelligent utilization of the State's credit may be, from the point of view of political economy, more correct than the cheaper method of increased taxation. If we consider the conditions in England, which have been the origin of her huge national debt, it is evident that even England could not at that time have borne the pressure of the taxes that would have been necessary. She undoubtedly acted correctly, whatever mistakes she made in details, when she employed the medium of credit for her Napoleonic wars, and left undisturbed the capital that was bearing better interest in private trade. That England kept becoming richer in spite of the colossal increase of her national debt, is to be explained in that way. And if any one tried to say of this, that these war-loans have been unproductive, even in the narrowest economic sense, we should be obliged to laugh. Was it an unproductive war-policy that brought the Cape of Good Hope, and who knows what else, into England's big pockets? The richest countries of the earth had been won.

But we see further, that with increasing economic culture in a nation a whole class of capitalists is neces-

sarily developed, and that it is a vital point for the State to bind this capital to itself. For, if it resigns itself and makes no use of its credit, it drives it abroad or into private businesses of every kind, very many of which are fraudulent. Thus the surprising truth emerges that, for the sake of public order and solidity, a State is in duty bound to have a large debt. That leads still further. My old friend Karl Mathy used always to say: "I wish nothing better for us Germans than a really heavy imperial debt; it would be the strongest material bond." The truth that lies in these words is unmistakable. We have seen it much too late. What the fact, that the South German capitalists all possessed Austrian securities, meant for the attitude of South Germany in 1866, is known to every one who lived there at that time.

France owes very much in this respect to her national debt organization. The fine, never-sufficiently-to-be-admired, national sense of the French brings it about of itself that every Frenchman who saves—and what Frenchman does not save?—invests his capital in the three-per-cent. consols, and only retains a fixed sum for speculative shares. That is an invaluable bond for the unity of the State. If after each of the numberless convulsions the State recovered its feet again so quickly, then there was that very obvious material cause, besides many moral reasons. The picture of the

French that has been so often drawn in our country since the time of "Young Germany" is indeed a completely false one. The French are more accurate reckoners, more sparing and saving than we Germans. The German has often by nature a trait not only of heroic boldness, but also of heroic carelessness, much more so than the shrewd, experienced Latin. The funds are for the saving Frenchman a bond which knits him very closely to his State; the State must not be ruined on any account.

§ 26. *Administration in the Narrower Sense.*

In England the boundary-line between the officials proper and the so-called "clerks" is placed, according to our ideas, very high up. The officials, in our sense of the word, number eighty at most. All the rest are "clerks," executive tools; they do not rise to the higher posts. English officialdom is not, like ours, a universally respected class; "clerks" of good family are found only in India, if at all. Rowland Hill was never an actual minister, an independent manager of the postal system; he remained always chief "clerk" in the Post Office. This dependent position, subaltern in the worst sense, of officialdom in England is of a piece, as we have seen, with the

whole character of the old English State, which was thoroughly aristocratic. Even in France the boundary-line is placed very high up between the small number of *fonctionnaires* and the huge majority of *employés*, the subalterns, who may be dismissed, like clerks, without ceremony and without pension. In this case, however, it is not to assure the aristocracy of Parliament, but in order that the head of the State for the time being may keep the whole mass of officials in hand; the possibility of sweeping away a great number at one time *ad nutum principis* must exist.

Germany, in accordance with her eminently scientific character, seeks the essence of genuine officialdom in an intellectual census. The idea that, with the evidence of a certain degree of education, the proof of ability to govern men is also adduced, is a genuinely German one, and is deeply rooted in the soil of our somewhat theoretical idealism. On the whole, however, it has proved itself to be true with us. The boundary-line between officials proper and subalterns is placed in Germany where the students end. Only in more recent times have other categories of officials, who can compare with the students, also been formed, in consequence of the great development of technical science. This boundary-line is now very much lower with us than in France and England. It goes down to the

lowest assessor, and for that reason German officialdom retains its, in a good sense, democratic character. But at the same time there has been developed within it a series of conceptions of the honour of the class which are foreign to other nations.

BOOK V. THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE

§ 27. *History of the Company of States.*

... WITH the Seven Years' War was linked the great colonial war between England and France, by which the question, whether the ocean should belong to the Latin race or the Germanic race, was finally decided. England conquered so decidedly that even to-day her predominance on the sea still continues. But every new victory over the French became for the English an occasion for trampling the law of nations underfoot. Under the appearance of fairness and justice, revolting ill-treatment of neutrals was perpetrated at sea. When the American colonies, which in the war against France had fought heroically on England's side, broke away from the mother country, a feeling of malicious joy passed over every land...

And, finally, the great national movements in Central Europe also break out: in 1859 the rising of Italy,

which leads in two short years to a united State, and since 1866 the decision in Germany. The victory of Germany over France turns the old system upside-down. Like Spain since the Pyrenean peace, France shows herself after the battle of Sedan powerless to dominate the world henceforth. The map of our part of the globe has been much more natural since; the centre is strengthened, the inspired idea, that the centre of gravity of Europe must lie in the middle, has become reality. Through the founding of the German empire a tranquillity has entered spontaneously into the system of States, inasmuch as ambition in Prussia can now be silent; Prussia has essentially attained the power she required. What threatens the peace of Europe at the present time is the reaction of those States on the circumference, who have been gradually forced into the background by the great reconstruction, and cannot bear with patience the loss of their former greatness. This elevation of Germany to real power is the one great change of the European system of States, which began with the year 1866; the other, the results of which have not yet borne their full fruit, is that a sixth power, Italy, has entered the old pentarchy of Europe. Spain's claim is a purely formal one, a mere question of vanity. On the contrary, one can say of Italy, that she is beginning to become a Great Power, without having been one hitherto. If

Italy wishes to become a real Great Power, she must fight; her first victories will raise her to the position to which that gifted nation has a distinct claim.

This is how we stand in the interior of Europe. Add to this the wonderfully altered conditions outside our part of the globe. In the course of little more than half a century a transformation has been accomplished, such as the earlier world never knew. China and Japan, which were formerly hermetically sealed to Europeans, began to open their harbours. Even of Australia it can be said, that it was only discovered fifty years ago; previous to that it was only a convict colony. In 1860 the proud expression was heard, "The South Sea is wakening up," a prophecy which has now been fulfilled. England, while posing as the defender of Liberalism, egged on the European States against one another, kept Europe in a condition of latent unrest, and conquered half the world in the mean time. And, if she continues to be successful in maintaining this condition of unrest on the Continent, she will put many more countries into her big pocket. Our nineteenth century is, as it were, the executor of the sixteenth. The discovery of the New World, which Columbus accomplished, has only now become a practical reality. The non-European world is entering more and more within the range of vision of the European States, and without any doubt the nations

of Europe must lay themselves out to subdue them directly or indirectly. We see the great process of expansive civilization continuing with the irresistible force of a power of Nature. Here there is no equilibrium, even in the slightest degree. He is a fool who would believe that this process of development could ever come to a standstill; but he who believes in perpetual peace must assume this. Not even on the map can we dream out a distribution of countries which would insure it. And the nations themselves are something living and growing. No one can say with absolute certainty when the small nationalities will decay internally and shrivel up, or when, on the other hand, they will exhibit an unexpected vital energy. The further course of things will depend upon this also, but that it will continue to be a perpetual growth and transformation, is as clear as noonday. And it is just in the changeful course of its history that the greatness of the human race displays itself; that the finest fruits of human culture and civilization ripen.

§ 28. *International Law and Intercourse.*

It is the very domain of war, however, in which, at the same time, the triumph of human reason is

most clearly exhibited. All noble nations have felt that the letting-loose of physical force in war required fixed laws, and therefore an international law of war, based on reciprocity, has developed. The greatest triumph of the science of international law lies in the field that is considered by fools to be purely and simply a barbaric one; in the law of war. We seldom find brutal contraventions of this law in modern times. It is, on the whole, the outstanding beauty of international law, that here, unmistakably, a continual progress is shown, and that, through the *universalis consensus* alone, a series of principles of international law has developed so firmly, that we can say to-day that they stand as securely as any legal axiom in the private code of any State. It is clear that international law must limp some paces behind national law, for certain principles of law and civilization must first be perfected within the States, before it is resolved to recognize them in international intercourse also. Thus no proceedings could be taken against slavery in the way of international law, until the idea of the dignity of man had spread so universally as it has done in our century. International law has developed in the course of centuries to an intensity of consciousness of right, which permits its formal part, at least, to appear fully assured. The publicity of political life nowadays contributes greatly to this. The times of the English

blue-books are indeed past. These blue, yellow, green-books and so on, are only intended to strew incense before the Philistine, which he cannot see through; it is not in the least difficult for a skilled diplomatist to deceive Parliament in this way. But the whole character of the life of the State has become so public nowadays, that a gross contravention of international law immediately excites great indignation among all civilized nations.

The right of the State which is waging war to bring all its troops into the field, no matter whether they are barbarians or civilized men, can be just as little disputed. Here we must remain unprejudiced as regards ourselves in order to avoid prejudices against any nation. How the Germans in the last war accused the French of murder because they set the Turcos to fight a civilized European nation! Of course one says things like that in the excitement of war; but science must remain calm and sober, and declare that this was in no way contrary to international law. For it remains the truth, that a State which is fighting is entitled and bound to bring into the fight all physical forces, all troops that it possesses. Where, then, is the limit? Where is Russia, with her amiable tribes, to draw the line in this matter? The physical

strength of a State can and must be fully employed in war, but only in the chivalrous forms which have been established by a long series of experiences of war. Of course the assertion of the French that they marched at the head of civilization was placed in a peculiar light by their use of such troops. A whole series of complaints has its sole origin in the fact that demands are made upon a State which it cannot possibly fulfil. In the national wars of to-day every brave subject is a spy. Therefore the expulsion of 80,000 Germans from France in the year 1870 was not, in point of fact, contrary to international law. Only the fact that the French acted with a certain brutality in the matter is not to be approved.

Of humanity in warfare, the well-known aphorism holds good in theory everywhere, in practice, of course, only in land warfare, that it is States and not their individual citizens that make war on one another. There must therefore be certain forms by which those persons can be recognized who are entitled to make war in the name of the State and to be treated as soldiers. There is no general unanimity as yet upon this point, and that is a nasty gap in international law. For on the feeling of the soldier that he has only to do with the enemy's soldiers, and does not need to fear that he will find every peasant, with whom he associates peacefully, aiming at him from

behind a bush half an hour later—on that feeling all humanity in war rests. If the soldier does not know whom he has to look upon as soldiers in the enemy's country, whom as robbers and waylayers, then he must become cruel and unfeeling. He alone can be looked upon as a soldier who has sworn the oath of fidelity to the colours, stands under the articles of war, and can be recognized by some distinguishing mark, which need not be a complete uniform. Ruthless severity against the franc-tireurs who swarm round the enemy without standing under the articles of war is self-evident. It is urgently necessary that an international agreement should be come to regarding the forms by which it may be recognized if an armed man really belongs to a legitimate army. This question was debated in Brussels in 1874, and the diversity of interests was then disclosed. Small States like Switzerland had no great desire to enter into binding obligations in the matter.

Every State is still in the mean time thrown back upon its own resources, and each settles, according to its own discretion, which enemies it looks upon as belonging to the army and which as simple robbers. From a moral point of view we could not but have respect for many franc-tireurs in 1870-71, who tried in despair to rescue their fatherland; but from the point of view of international law they were street-robbers...

Even when the power of the enemy is an actual, purely military one, and the point whether enemies belong to the army or not can be clearly and definitely decided, private property can be spared in very large measure. Requisitions are permitted; it is the universal custom to give *bons* for them; it is, of course, left to the conquered to get them all paid later. War against private property as such, of which Melac's devastation of the Palatinate is a terrible example, or the burning of a village out of pure wantonness, is considered nowadays by all civilized States as an offence against international law. Private property may only be injured to such an extent as is absolutely necessary for the successful conduct of the war...

There has further been developed in international law the principle that those great treasures of culture of a State, which minister to Art and Science, must be looked upon as the common property of all mankind, and must be secured from loot and robbery. Formerly this principle was systematically trodden underfoot.

THE END.

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